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Preference Signaling in Matching Markets
By Peter Coles, Alexey Kushnir, and Muriel Niederle∗
Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot
give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide
information about their preferences for particular employers, and
employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In
this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker
can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches
in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism
increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while
the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism
adds the most value for balanced markets.
JEL: C72, C78, D80, J44
Keywords: signaling, cheap talk, matching, market design
Job seekers in labor markets often “cast a wide net” by applying for many
positions, as there is a low cost for applying and a high value for being employed.
Consequently, many employers face the daunting task of reviewing and evaluating
large numbers of applications. Moreover, since pursuing candidates is costly,
employers must assess not only the quality of an applicant, but also whether
the applicant is attainable: that is, whether the candidate is likely to ultimately
accept a job offer, should the employer make one. In this paper we study a
mechanism that aids employers in this evaluation process by allowing applicants
to credibly signal information about their preferences for positions.
In practice, in many markets that suffer from this form of application conges-
tion, candidates communicate special interest in a select number of positions. For
example, in college admissions in the United States, many universities have early
admission programs, where high school seniors may apply to exactly one college
before the general application period. Evidence suggests that universities respond
to such action in that it is easier to get into a college through early admission pro-
grams (Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser, 2003).1 Another example of applicants
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1Under single early application programs, universities often require that an applicant not apply early
to other schools, and this is often enforced by high school guidance counselors. In another example of
colleges looking for signs of interest, many schools take great care to note whether applicants visit the
campus, which presumably is costly for parents in terms of time and money.
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signaling interest can be found in the market for entry-level clinical psychologists,
which in the early 1990’s was organized as a telephone-based market. On “match
day,” program directors called applicants to make offers, and candidates were, at
any moment, allowed to hold on to at most one offer. At the end of match day,
all nonaccepted offers were automatically declared as rejected. Due in part to
its limited time frame, this market suffered from congestion, and it was common
for program directors to make offers out of their preference order to applicants
who credibly indicated they would accept an offer immediately (Roth and Xing,
1997).2
Some markets have formal, market-wide mechanisms that allow participants
to signal preferences, and the formal nature of the signals ensures credibility.
Since 2006, The American Economic Association (AEA) has operated a signal-
ing service to facilitate the job search for economics graduate students. Using
this service, students can send signals to up to two employers to indicate their
interest in receiving an interview at the annual Allied Social Science Associations
(ASSA) meeting. Coles et al. (2010) provide suggestive evidence that sending a
signal of interest increases the chances of receiving an interview. Since interviews
take place over a single weekend, departments typically interview about twenty
candidates out of hundreds of applicants, which suggests that most departments
must strategically choose from among their candidates that are above the bar.3
In a related category of markets, some online dating websites allow participants
to send signals to potential partners. For example in the matchmaking service of
the website “Hot or Not,” participants can send each other virtual flowers that
purportedly increase the chances of receiving a positive response.4 In a field ex-
periment on a major Korean online dating website, Lee et al. (2011) study the
effect of a user attaching one of a limited number of “virtual roses” to a date
request. They find that users of both genders are more likely to accept a request
2Congestion in the telephone market was costly for program directors who worried that their offer
would be held the whole match day and then rejected in the last moments, leaving them to fill the
position in a hectic “aftermarket” with only a few leftover candidates. As an example of offer strategy,
the directors of one internship program decided to make their first offers (for their five positions) to
numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, and 12 on their rank-order list of candidates, with the rationale that 3, 5, and 12 had
indicated that they would accept immediately and that 1 and 2 were so attractive as to be worth taking
chances on. Anecdotal evidence suggests that promises to accept an offer were binding. The market was
relatively small, and as one program director mentioned: “you see these people again.”
3Similar mechanisms exist for nonacademic jobs. For example, Skydeck360, a student-operated com-
pany at Harvard, offers a signaling service for MBA students in their search for internships and full-time
jobs. Each registered student can send up to ten signals to employers via their secure website. (See
http://skydeck360.posterous.com for detail.)
4In this case the number of flowers one may send is unlimited, but each flower is costly. Signals of
interest may be helpful in dating markets because pursuing partners bears real costs. At the very least,
each user may be limited in the number of serious dates she can have in a given period. “As James Hong
from HotorNot tells it, his virtual flower service has three components: there’s the object itself represented
by a graphical flower icon, there’s the gesture of someone sending the flower to their online crush, and
finally, there’s the trophy effect of everyone else being able to see that you got a flower. People on
HotorNot are paying $10 to send the object of their affection a virtual flower – which is a staggering 3-4x
what you might pay for a real flower!” (from http://www.viralblog.com/research/why-digital-consumers-
buy-virtual-goods/) See http://www.hotornot.com/m/?flowerBrochure=1 for a description of HotorNot’s
virtual flower offerings.
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when a virtual rose is attached.5
These examples all share three important features. First, in each case, substan-
tial frictions lead to market congestion: employers (or colleges or dating partners)
are unable to give full attention to all possible candidates when making decisions.
Second, applicants are ready to provide information about their preferences over
employers. Third, employers value this preference information and are prepared
to act on it.
For employers to take useful action, preference signals must be credible. But
simply declaring one’s interest typically bears almost no cost, and job seekers
have an incentive to indicate particular interest to many employers, regardless of
how strong their preferences towards these employers actually are. Hence, absent
any credibility guarantee, employers may struggle to discern which preference
information is sincere and which is simply cheap talk. So while candidates may
wish to signal their preferences, and employers may value learning candidate
preferences, inability to credibly convey information may prevent any gains from
preference signaling from being realized.
In this paper, we investigate how a signaling mechanism that limits the number
of signals a job seeker may send can overcome the credibility problem and improve
the welfare of market participants. We develop a model that can account for the
three stylized facts mentioned above. In our model, firms may make a limited
number of offers to workers, so that firms must carefully select the workers to
whom they make offers. We focus on the strategic question of offer choice and
abstract away the question of acquiring information that determines preferences.
Hence, we assume that each agent knows her own preferences over agents on the
other side of the market, but is uncertain of the preferences of other agents.
In our model, we introduce a new class of preferences for workers we term
block-correlated preferences. In particular, firms can be partitioned in blocks,
so that all workers agree about ranking of firm blocks; however, within a block,
workers have idiosyncratic preferences over firms. Firm preferences are idiosyn-
cratic and uniformly distributed. This modeling choice of preferences allows for
correlation of workers’ preferences, keeps the model tractable, and adequately
describes many characteristics of labor markets. For example, in the job market
for new PhD economists, economics departments may be roughly ranked based
on academic output or other factors. Graduate students form their preferences
based on not only this academic ranking, but also on idiosyncratic factors in-
cluding family preferences, location, climate and colleagues. Block correlation is
meant to capture the notion that while students may roughly agree on ranking
of tiers of departments, their idiosyncratic preferences dictate which departments
are preferred within each tier.
Workers have the opportunity to send a signal to one firm, where each signal is
5This dating website targets people looking for marriage partners, rather than people who want many
dates. Hence, dates may be perceived as particularly costly, so users must decide carefully on whom to
“spend” a date. The study found that candidates of average attractiveness, who may worry that date
offers are only “safety” offers, are particularly responsive to signals of special interest.
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binary in nature and does not transmit any further information. Firms observe
their signals, but not the signals of other firms, and then each firm simultaneously
makes exactly one offer to a worker. Finally, workers choose offers from those
available to them. We focus on equilibria in anonymous strategies to eliminate
any coordination devices beyond the signaling mechanism.
We show that, in expectation, introducing a signaling mechanism increases both
the number of matches as well as the welfare of workers. Intuitively, when firms
make offers to workers who send them signals, these offers are unlikely to overlap,
leading to a higher expected number of matches. Furthermore, workers are not
only more likely to be matched, but are also more likely to be matched to a firm
they prefer the most. On the other hand, when a firm makes an offer to a worker
who has signaled it, this creates strong competition for firms in the same block
who would like to make an offer to that same worker because, for example, they
rank that worker highest. Hence, by responding to signals, that is, being more
likely to make offers to workers who have signaled them, firms may generate a
negative spillover on other firms in the same block. Consequently, the effect on
firm welfare from introducing a signaling mechanism is ambiguous; welfare for
a firm depends on the balance between individual benefit from responding to
signals and the negative spillover generated by other firms responding to signals.
Furthermore, we show that the degree to which a firm responds to signals is a case
of strategic complements. When one firm responds more to signals, it becomes
riskier for other firms to make offers to workers who have not sent them signals.
Consequently, multiple equilibria, with varying responsiveness to signals, may
exist. If there is a single block of firms, these equilibria can be welfare ranked:
workers prefer equilibria where firms respond more to signals, while firms prefer
the equilibria where they respond less.
To understand when a signaling mechanism might be most helpful, we compare
performance across market settings. To do this, we focus on a simpler environment
with a single block of firms where agents care about getting a match, but not the
quality of the match. Hence, the value of introducing a signaling mechanism is
simply the expected increase in the number of matches. For such an environment,
we find that the value of a signaling mechanism is maximal for balanced markets;
that is, markets where the number of firms and workers are of roughly the same
magnitude. We further show that the increase in the number of matches is roughly
homogenous of degree one in the number of firms and workers. That is, signaling
mechanisms are equally important for large and small markets in terms of the
expected increase in the fraction of matched participants. Finally, we show that
when we extend the number of periods in a market, the value of signaling is
reduced, as additional periods serve as an alternative means of mitigating market
congestion.
Our approach is related to several strands of literature. A standard interpreta-
tion of signaling and its effectiveness is that applicants have private information
that is pertinent to how valuable an employee they would be. In Spence’s clas-
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sic signaling model (Spence, 1973), applicants use wasteful, costly signals (e.g.,
education), to signal their type (e.g., their ability). Hoppe, Moldovanu and Sela
(2009) extend this idea to an environment where agents on both sides of the
market may send signals.6 More recently, Avery and Levin (2010) model early
application in US college admissions as a way for students to signal college-specific
quality, such as enthusiasm for a particular college. In their model, colleges ex-
plicitly derive more utility from having enthusiastic students in their freshman
class than they do from other, equally able students. By contrast, in our model
we abstract away from such motives and instead show how congestion, stemming
from the explicit opportunity costs of making offers, can generate room for useful
preference signaling.
A more closely related strand of literature is that of strategic information trans-
mission, or “cheap talk,” between a sender and receiver, introduced in Crawford
and Sobel (1982). Our analysis varies from the standard model here in that we
consider a multi-stage game with many senders (workers) and many receivers
(firms), where the structure of allowable signals plays a distinctive role. Each
sender must choose the receiver to whom she will send one of her limited, iden-
tical signals, and the scarcity of signals induces credibility. Each receiver knows
only whether a sender has sent a signal to it or not, and receives no additional
information. While Crawford and Sobel (1982) study a information transmission
problem between the sender and receiver, our setting includes an additional co-
ordination problem among receivers who must decide whom to make an offer.
Nevertheless, some features of Crawford and Sobel persist in our model. Signals
are “cheap” in the sense that they do not have a direct influence on agent payoffs.
Each agent has only a limited number of signals, so there is an opportunity cost
associated with sending a signal. Finally, in our model there always exist bab-
bling equilibria where agents ignore signals; hence, the introduction of a signaling
mechanism always enlarges the set of equilibria.
Like the classical search literature, our model considers decentralized agent
interactions (see e.g. Montgomery, 1991; Peters, 1991). Our paper contributes
to this line of work via its analysis of a mechanism that helps agents on one side
of the market influence whether they will be approached by the agents on the
other side of the market. Our model considers incomplete information with a
finite number of agents, compared to the complete information models with a
continuum of agents that are common in this literature.7 Since we abstract away
from wage competition and search frictions we do not study the equilibrium wage
dispersion and the frictionless limit of markets that are central questions in this
area of research (see e.g. Kircher, 2009).
While to our knowledge we are the first to introduce preference signaling in
decentralized markets, papers by Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2012) and Lee
6See also Damiano and Li (2007) and Hopkins (forthcoming) for related models.
7For the relationship between finite and infinite economies in a directed search framework see Gale-
nianos and Kircher (2012).
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and Schwarz (2007) deal with preference signaling in the presence of centralized
clearinghouses. Parendo (2010) analyzes coordination signaling in a model of
complete information with identical employers and commonly ranked employees.
Ely and Siegel (2012) study how interview decisions transmit information in a
common-value labor setting with many firms and one worker.
In summary, our paper models the introduction of a signaling mechanism in
markets where interviews or offers are costly for firms, either in direct monetary
terms or because of opportunity costs. Our results suggest potentially large wel-
fare gains for workers, and an increase in the expected total number of matches.
Furthermore, as the experience with the economic job market shows, introducing
a signaling mechanism can be a low cost, unintrusive means of improving market
outcomes. As such we see our paper as part of the larger market design literature
(see Roth, 2008).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I begins with a simple example, and
Section II discusses the offer games with and without a signaling mechanism.
Section III analyzes equilibria properties for both setups. Section IV considers
the impact of introducing a signaling mechanism on the welfare of agents. Section
V analyzes the robustness of the welfare results across various market structures.
Section VI concludes.
I. A Simple Example
In this section we lay out a simple example that shows the effects of introducing
a signaling mechanism and highlights some of our main findings. Consider a
market with two firms {f1, f2} and two workers {w1, w2}. For each agent, a match
with one’s most preferred partner from the other side of the market yields payoff
1, while a match with one’s second choice partner yields x ∈ (0, 1). Remaining
unmatched yields payoff 0.
Ex-ante, agent preferences are random, uniform and independent. That is, for
each firm f , the probability that f prefers worker w1 to worker w2 is one half,
as is the probability that f prefers w2 to w1. Worker preferences over firms are
similarly symmetric. Agents learn their own preferences, but not the preferences
of other agents.
We first examine behavior in a game where once agent preferences are realized,
each firm may make a single offer to a worker, and workers then accept at most
one of their available offers. We will examine sequential equilibria, which ensures
that workers accept their best available offer.
In the unique equilibrium of this game where firm strategies do not depend on
the name of the worker, each firm simply makes an offer to its most preferred
worker.8 This follows because firms cannot discern which worker is more likely
to accept an offer. In this congested market there is a fifty percent chance that
both firms make an offer to the same worker, in which case there will only be one
8See Section II for a formal definition of anonymous strategies.
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match. Hence, on average there are 1.5 matches, and the expected payoff for each
firm is 341 +
1
40 = 0.75. For workers, if they receive exactly one offer, it is equally
likely to be from their first or second choice firm. There is also a fifty percent
chance that one worker receives two offers, which ensures a payoff of one. The
expected payoff for each worker is then (2 + x)/4.
We now introduce a signaling mechanism: before firms make offers, each worker
may send a signal to a single firm. Each signal has a binary nature: either a
firm receives a signal from a particular worker or it does not; signals do not not
transmit any other information. We focus on non-babbling equilibria, where firms
interpret a signal as a sign of being the more preferred firm of that worker, and
workers send a signal to their more preferred firm.9
To analyze firm behavior, note that a firm that receives a signal from its top
worker will make this worker an offer, since it will certainly be accepted. If on the
other hand a firm receives no signals, it again optimally makes an offer to its top
worker, as symmetry implies the workers are equally likely to accept an offer. The
interesting strategic decision a firm must make is when it receives a signal only
from its second ranked worker. In this case the other firm also receives exactly
one signal. We say a firm “responds” to the signal if it makes the signaling worker
an offer, and “ignores” the signal if it instead makes an offer to its top worker,
which did not send it a signal.
Suppose f1 prefers w1 to w2 and only w2 sent a signal to f1, which implies w1
sent a signal to f2. When f1 makes an offer to w2, f1 is ensured a payoff of x.
Suppose f1 instead makes an offer to w1, who sent a signal to f2. If f2 responds
to signals, then f2 also makes an offer to w1, which w1 will accept, hence leaving
f1 a payoff of 0. If f2 ignores signals, then there is still a fifty percent chance that
w1 is actually f2’s first choice, in which case an offer is tendered and accepted, so
that f1 again receives 0. Otherwise, f1 receives 1. Table 1 summarizes f1’s payoffs
conditional on receiving a signal from its second ranked worker, and the strategies
of f2. Table 1 shows that strategies of firms are strategic complements. If a firm
Table 1— A simple example
f1\f2 Respond Ignore
Respond x x
Ignore 0 1/2
Note: Table shows firm f1’s payoffs conditional on receiving a signal from its second ranked worker.
responds to signals, then the other firm is weakly better off from responding
to signals as well. In this example, if f2 switches from the action ignore (not
9Note that there is no equilibrium where firms interpret signals as a lack of interest. If this were
the case, workers would simply not send any signal. There are, however, babbling equilibria where no
information is transmitted. We will not focus on these in this paper, as they are equivalent to not having
a signaling device.
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making an offer to a second choice worker who has signaled) to the safe action of
responding (making an offer to a second choice worker who has signaled), then
f1 optimally also takes the safe action of responding.
Turning to equilibrium analysis, note that if x > 0.5 there is a unique equilib-
rium in which both firms respond to signals. When x < 0.5, that is when the value
of the first choice worker is much greater than that of the second ranked worker,
there exist two equilibria in pure strategies. In the first, both firms respond to
signals (Respond-Respond) and in the second both firm ignore signals (Ignore-
Ignore).10 Table 2 summarizes welfare properties of these equilibria. Note that
the expected firm and worker payoffs, as well as the expected number of matches
when signals are ignored are the same as when there is no signaling mechanism,
since agent actions in these two settings are identical.11 Whenever there are mul-
Table 2— Welfare outcomes
Firm Payoffs Worker Payoffs Number of Matches
Respond-Respond (5 + 2x)/8 (6 + x)/8 7/4
Ignore-Ignore 3/4 (2 + x)/4 3/2
Note: Welfare outcomes in equilibria “Respond-Respond” and “Ignore-Ignore”.
tiple equilibria (x < 0.5), we can rank them in terms of firm welfare, worker
welfare, and the expected number of matches. Workers and firms are opposed
in their preferences over equilibria: workers prefer the equilibrium in which both
firms respond to signals while firms prefer the equilibrium in which they both
ignore signals. Intuitively, while one firm may privately gain from responding to
a signal, such an action may negatively affect the other firm. The expected num-
ber of matches in the equilibrium when both firms respond to signals is always
greater than in the equilibrium when both firms ignore the signals.
These welfare results enable us to study the effects of introducing a signaling
mechanism, as outcomes in the offer game without signals are identical to those
when both firms ignore signals. The expected number of matches and the welfare
of workers in the offer game with signals in any nonbabbling equilibrium are
greater than in the offer game with no signals. The welfare of firms changes
ambiguously with the introduction of a signaling mechanism. We now show that
these results generalize.
10There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium whenever there are two pure strategy equilibria. Properties
of this equilibrium coincide with those in the equilibrium where both firms respond to signals.
11When both firms respond to signals, since each firm has a fifty percent chance of receiving a signal
from its first choice worker, half the time this strategy yields payoff of one. Otherwise a firm has a 1/4
chance of receiving a signal from its second choice worker only, yielding a payoff of x. With a 1/4 chance
a firm receives no signal, in which case it makes an offer to its first choice worker, who will accept with
fifty percent probability (whenever she is not the first choice worker of the other firm). Hence, expected
firm payoffs equals 5+2x
8
. Payoffs for workers and the expected number of matches can similarly be
calculated given these outcomes.
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II. Model: The Offer Game Without and With Signals
Let F = {f1, . . . , fF } be the set of firms, and W = {w1, . . . , wW } be the set of
workers, with |F| = F and |W| = W . We consider markets with at least two firms
and two workers. Firms and workers have preferences over each other. For each
firm f , let Θf be the set of all possible preference lists over workers, where θf ∈ Θf
is a vector of length W . We use the convention that the worker of rank one is the
most preferred worker, while the worker of rank W is the least preferred worker.
The set of all firm preference profiles is ΘF = (Θf )
F . Firm f with preference list
θf values a match with worker w as u(θf , w), where u(θf , ·) is a von-Neumann
Morgenstern utility function. Firms are symmetric in the following sense: a firm’s
utility for a match depends only on a worker’s rank. That is, for any permutation
ρ of worker indices, we have u(ρ(θf ), ρ(w)) = u(θf , w).
12 Furthermore, all firms
have the same utility function u(·, ·).
Similarly, we define θw, Θw and ΘW for workers. Worker w with preference list
θw values a match with firm f as v(θw, f), where match utility again depends
only on rank, and all workers share the same utility function.
Though not essential for our results, we will assume that workers and firms
derive zero utility from being unmatched, and that any match is preferable to re-
maining unmatched for all participants. We denote the set of all agent preference
list profiles as Θ ≡ ΘF × ΘW and let t(·) be the distribution over this set. A
market is given by the 5-tuple 〈F ,W, t, u, v〉.
In our model we consider block-correlated distributions of preferences. That
is, firms can be partitioned in blocks, so that all workers agree which block con-
tains the most desirable firms, which block the second most desirable set of firms
and so on. However, within a block, workers have idiosyncratic preferences over
firms. Each firm has preferences over the workers chosen uniformly, randomly and
independently from the set of all strict preference orderings over all workers.13
DEFINITION 1: The distribution of agent preferences t(·) is block-correlated if
there exists a partition F1, . . . ,FB of the firms into blocks are such that
1) For any b < b′, where b, b′ ∈ {1, . . . , B}, each worker prefers every firm in
block Fb to any firm in block Fb′;
2) Each worker’s preferences within each block Fb are uniform and indepen-
dent; and
3) Each firm’s preferences over workers are uniform and independent.
12Let ρ : {1, . . . ,W} → {1, . . . ,W} be a permutation. Abusing notation, we apply ρ to preference
lists, workers, and sets of workers such that the permutation applies to the worker indices. For example,
suppose W = 3, ρ(1) = 2, ρ(2) = 3, and ρ(3) = 1. Then we have θf = (w1, w2, w3) ⇒ ρ(θf ) =
(w2, w3, w1) and ρ(w1) = w2.
13For tractability, we consider only correlation of worker preferences and not correlation of firm pref-
erences, though our intuition is that benefits from signaling would extend in a model where workers are
also partioned in blocks.
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Block-correlated preferences are meant to capture the notion that many two-
sided markets are segmented. That is, workers may largely agree on the ranking
of blocks on the other side of the market, but vary in their preferences within
each block. For example, workers might agree on the set of firms that constitute
the “top tier” of the market; however within that tier, preferences are influenced
by factors specific to each worker.
A. The Offer Game with No Signals
In the absence of a signaling mechanism play proceeds as follows. After prefer-
ences of firms and workers are realized, each firm simultaneously makes an offer to
at most one worker. Workers then choose at most one offer from those available
to them. Sequential rationality ensures that workers will always select the best
available offer. Hence, we take the behavior in the last stage as given and focus
on the reduced game with only firms as strategic players.
Once its preference list θf (f ’s type) is realized, firm f decides whether and
to whom to make an offer. Firm f may use a mixed strategy denoted by σf
which maps the set of preference lists to the set of distributions over the union of
workers with the no-offer option, denoted by N ; that is σf : Θf → ∆(W ∪N ).14
We denote a profile of all firms’ strategies as σF = (σf1 , ...σfF ), and the set of
firm f ’s possible strategies as Σf .
Let the function pif : (Σf )
F×Θ→ R denote the payoff of firm f as a function of
firm strategies and realized agent types. We are now ready to define the Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of the offer game with no signals.
DEFINITION 2: Strategy profile σˆF is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the offer
game with no signals if for all f ∈ F and θ¯f ∈ Θf , the strategy σˆf maximizes the
profit of firm f of type θ¯f . That is,
σˆf (θ¯f ) ∈ arg maxσ
f
∈Σf Eθ−f (pif (σf , σˆ−f ,θ) | θ¯f ).
We focus on equilibria in which firm strategies are anonymous; that is, they
depend only on workers’ ranks within a firm’s preference list.15 This rules out
strategies that rely on worker indices, eliminating any coordination linked to the
identity of workers. As an example, “always make an offer to my second-ranked
worker” is an anonymous strategy, while “always make an offer to the worker
called w2” is not.
DEFINITION 3: Firm f ’s strategy σf is anonymous if for any permutation ρ,
and for any preference profile θf ∈ Θf , we have σf (ρ(θf )) = ρ(σf (θf )).16
14In other words, f selects elements of a W -dimensional simplex; σf (θf ) ∈ ∆W , where ∆W = {x ∈
RW+1 :
∑W+1
i=1 xi = 1, and xi ≥ 0 for each i}.
15This assumption is standard in search literature (see e.g. Shimer, 2005; Kircher, 2009).
16As stated in footnote 12 we consider only permutations of the worker indices in strategy profile
ρ(σf (θf )) and do not permute the no-offer option, i.e. ρ(N ) = N .
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B. The Offer Game with Signals
We now modify the game so that each worker may send a “signal” to exactly one
firm. A signal is a fixed message; that is, the only decision of workers is whether
and to whom to send a signal. No decision can be made about the content of
the signal. Note that the signal does not directly affect the firm’s utility, as the
firm’s utility from hiring a worker is determined by how high the firm ranks that
worker. However, the signal of a worker may affect a firm’s beliefs over whether
that worker is likely to accept an offer. Since we have a congested market where
firms can only make one offer, these beliefs may affect the firm’s decision of whom
to make an offer. The offer game with signals proceeds in three stages:
1) Agents’ preferences are realized. Each worker decides whether to send a
signal, and to which firm. Signals are sent simultaneously, and are observed
only by firms who have received them.
2) Each firm makes an offer to at most one worker; offers are made simultane-
ously.
3) Each worker accepts at most one offer from the set of offers she receives.
Once again, sequential rationality ensures that workers will always select the best
available offer. Hence, we take this behavior for workers as given and focus on
the reduced game consisting of the first two stages.
In the first stage, each worker sends a signal to a firm, or else chooses not to
send a signal. A mixed strategy for worker w is a map from the set of all possible
preference lists to the set of distributions over the union of firms and the no-signal
option, denoted by N ; that is, σw : Θw → ∆(F ∪ N ). In the second stage, each
firm observes the set of workers that sent it a signal,WS ⊂ W ∪N , and based on
these signals forms beliefs µf (·|WS) about the preferences of workers. Each firm,
based on these beliefs as well as its preferences, decides whether and to whom to
make an offer. A mixed strategy of firm f is a map from the set of all possible
preference lists, Θf , and the set of all possible combinations of received signals,
2W , which is the set of all subsets of workers, to the set of distributions over the
union of workers and the no-offer option. That is, σf : Θf × 2W → ∆(W ∪N ).
We denote a profile of all worker and firm strategies as σW = (σw1 , ...σwW ) and
σF = (σf1 , ...σfF ) respectively.
The payoff to firm f is a function of firm and worker strategies and realized
agent types, which we again denote as pif : (Σw)
W × (Σf )F ×Θ→ R. Similarly,
define the payoff of workers as piw : (Σw)
W × (Σf )F × Θ → R. As the offer
game with signals is a multi-stage game of incomplete information, we consider
sequential equilibrium as the solution concept.
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DEFINITION 4: Strategy profile σˆ = (σˆW , σˆF ) and posterior beliefs µˆf (·|WS)
for each firm f and each subset of workers WS ⊂ W ∪N are a sequential equi-
librium if
σˆw(θ¯w) ∈ arg max
σw∈Σw
Eθ−w(piw(σw, σˆ−w,θ) | θ¯w)
for any w ∈ W, θ¯w ∈ ΘW and
σˆf (θ¯f ,WS) ∈ arg max
σf∈Σf
Eθ−f (pif (σf , σˆ−f ,θ) | θ¯f ,WS , µˆf )
for any f ∈ F , θ¯f ∈ Θf , WS ⊂ W ∪N , where σˆ−a denotes the strategies of all
agents except a, for a = w, f , and beliefs are defined using Bayes’ rule.17
We again focus on equilibria where agents use anonymous strategies, thereby
eliminating unrealistic sources of coordination.
DEFINITION 5: Firm f ’s strategy σf is anonymous if for any permutation ρ,
preference profile θf ∈ Θf , and subset of workers WS ⊂ W ∪N who send f a
signal, we have σf (ρ(θf ), ρ(WS)) = ρ(σf (θf ,WS)). Worker w’s strategy σw is
anonymous if for any permutation ρ that permutes only firm orderings within
blocks and any preference profile θw ∈ Θw, we have σw(ρ(θw)) = ρ(σw(θw)).18
III. Equilibrium Analysis
A. The Offer Game with No Signals
Let us first consider the offer game with no signals. When deciding whom to
make an offer, firms must consider both the utility from hiring a specific worker
and the likelihood that this worker will accept an offer. Because preferences of
firms are independently and uniformly chosen from all possible preference order-
ings, and since firms use anonymous strategies, an offer to any worker will be
accepted with equal probability. Hence, each firm optimally makes an offer to the
highest-ranked worker on its preference list. Indeed, this is the unique equilibrium
when firms use anonymous strategies.
PROPOSITION 1: The unique equilibrium of the offer game with no signals
when firms use anonymous strategies and workers accept the best available offer
is σf (θf ) = θ
1
f for all f ∈ F and θf ∈ Θf .
Note that the above statement requires that firm strategies be anonymous only in
equilibrium. Firm deviations that do not satisfy the anonymity assumption are
still allowed. As seen in the example in Section I, in this equilibrium there might
be considerable lack of coordination, leaving many firms and workers unmatched.
17As usual in a sequential equilibrium, permissible off-equilibrium beliefs are defined by considering
the limits of completely mixed strategies.
18As stated in footnote 12 we consider only permutations of the worker indices in ρ(WS) and
ρ(σf (θf ,WS)) and do not permute the no-signaling and the no-offer option, i.e. ρ(N ) = N .
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B. The Offer Game with Signals
We now turn to the offer game with signals, where we will be interested in
equilibria where firms within each block play symmetric, anonymous strategies.
That is, if firm f and firm f ′ belong to the same block Fb, for some b ∈ {1, ..., B},
they play the same anonymous strategies and have the same beliefs. We call
such firm strategies and firm beliefs block-symmetric. We denote equilibria where
firm strategies and firm beliefs are block-symmetric and worker strategies are
anonymous and symmetric as block-symmetric equilibria.
Our first step in characterizing the set of block-symmetric equilibria is to pin
down the strategies of workers, who must choose whether to send a signal, and
if so, to which firm. In block-symmetric equilibria, firms within each block use
the same anonymous strategies. Hence, we can denote the ex-ante probability of
a worker w receiving an offer from a firm in block Fb, conditional on w sending
and not sending a signal to it as psb and p
ns
b correspondingly. We also denote the
equilibrium probability that a worker sends her signal to a firm in block Fb as αb,
where αb ∈ [0, 1] and
∑B
b=1 αb ≤ 1.
The following proposition characterizes worker strategies in all block-symmetric
sequential equilibria that satisfy a multiplayer analog of Criterion D1 of Cho and
Kreps (1987).19
PROPOSITION 2 (Worker Strategies): Consider a block-symmetric sequential
equilibrium that satisfies Criterion D1. Then either
1) Signals do not influence offers: for every b ∈ {1, ..., B}, psb = pnsb or
2) Signals sent in equilibrium increase the chances of receiving an offer: there
exists b0 ∈ {1, ..., B} such that psb0 > pnsb0 and
a) for any b ∈ {1, ..., B} such that αb > 0, we have psb > pnsb , and if a
worker sends her signal to block Fb, she sends her signal to her most
preferred firm within Fb, and
b) for any b′ ∈ {1, ..., B} such that αb′ = 0, workers’ strategies are optimal
for any off-equilibrium beliefs of firms from block Fb′.
Proposition 2 states that there are two types of block-symmetric equilibria that
satisfy Criterion D1. Equilibria of the first type are babbling, where firms ignore
signals. The outcomes of these equilibria coincide with the outcome in the offer
games with no signals. Consequently, the signaling mechanism adds no value in
this case. In equilibria of the second type, workers send signals only to their most
preferred firm in each block, possibly mixing across these top firms (see Figure 1).
19Criterion D1 lets us characterize beliefs when firms receive “unexpected,” or off-equilibrium, signals.
See the proof of Proposition 2 for the definition of our analog of Criterion D1 of Cho and Kreps (1987).
Other refinements could also be used in our equilibrium characterization: for example, we could replace
Criterion D1 with “universal divinity” of Banks and Sobel (1987) or by “never a weak best response” of
Cho and Kreps (1987) without making a change to the statement of Proposition 2.
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Figure 1. Signals in block symmetric equilibiria.
Note: In block symmetric equilibria, a worker sending a signal may mix over multiple firms, but these
firms may include only the worker’s most preferred firm in any block. When a firm receives a signal
in equilibrium, it interprets this as meaning it is the signaling worker’s most preferred firm within the
block.
It is quite natural to expect that in equilibrium, workers may signal to multiple
blocks with positive probability. Note that if all workers were signaling to the
same block, the benefits to a single worker from signaling to a different block
could be quite high.
In equilibrium workers only send signals to blocks in which firms respond to
signals; that is, the chances of receiving an offer from the firm they signaled
must be higher than if they had not sent that signal. Moreover, if in equilibrium
worker w is not prescribed to signal to some block Fb′ , then w’s choice of αb′ = 0
is optimal for any beliefs of firms in block Fb′ . In particular, this strategy would
be optimal even if firms in block Fb′ interpreted unexpected signals in the most
favorable way; i.e., upon receiving a signal from worker w, each firm f in Fb′
believes that it is w’s most preferred firm within block Fb′ .
We call strategies where workers send signals only to their most preferred firm
in any block (or mix over such firms) best-in-block strategies. We call beliefs where
a firm interprets a signal from a worker w as indicating it is the most preferred
firm of w in that block best-in-block beliefs. We will now assume that workers use
symmetric best-in-block strategies and that firms have best-in-block beliefs, and
examine firm offers in the second stage of the game.20
20Note that firms have best-in-block beliefs on the equilibrium path in any block-symmetric equilib-
rium. In addition, a block-symmetric equilibrium satisfies Criterion D1 if and only if worker strategies
remain optimal if firm off-equilibrium beliefs are best-in-block beliefs. Hence, we will focus on equilibria
where firms have best-in-block beliefs even off the equilibrium path. See the proof of Proposition 2 in
the Appendix for details.
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Call f ’s most preferred worker Tf (f ’s top-ranked worker). Consider a firm f
that has received signals from a subset of workers WS ⊂ W ∪N . We denote
|WS | be the number of received signals and assume that |N | = 0. Call f ’s most
preferred worker in this subset Sf (f ’s most preferred signaling worker). The
expected payoff to f from making an offer to Tf or Sf (whichever yields greater
payoff) is strictly greater than the payoff from making an offer to any other
worker. This follows from symmetry of worker strategies and block-symmetry
and anonymity of firm strategies: for any two workers who sent a signal, f ’s
expectation that these workers will accept an offer is identical. Hence, if f makes
an offer to a worker who sent a signal, it should make that offer to the worker
it prefers the most among them. The same logic holds for any two workers who
have not sent a signal. (Proposition A1 in the Appendix provides a rigorous
argument for the above statements). This suggests a special kind of strategy for
firms, which we will call a cutoff strategy.
DEFINITION 6 (Cutoff Strategies): Strategy σf is a cutoff strategy for firm f if
∃j1, . . . , jW ∈ {1, . . . ,W}, such that for any θf ∈ Θf and any set WS of workers
who sent a signal,
σf (θf ,WS) =
{
Sf if rankθf (Sf ) ≤ j|WS |
Tf otherwise.
We call (j1, . . . , jW ) f ’s cutoff vector, which has as its components cutoffs for
each positive number |WS | of received signals.
A firm f which employs a cutoff strategy need only look at the rank of the most
preferred worker who sent it a signal, conditional on the number of signals f
has received. If the rank of this worker is below a certain cutoff (lower ranks
are better since one is the most preferred rank), then the firm makes an offer to
this most preferred signaling worker Sf . Otherwise the firm makes an offer to its
overall top ranked worker Tf . Cutoffs may in general depend on the number of
signals the firm receives. This is because the number of signals received provides
information about the signals the other firms received. This in turn affects the
behavior of other firms and hence the optimal decision for firm f . Note that any
cutoff strategy is, by definition, an anonymous strategy.
While we defined cutoffs as integers, we can extend the definition to include
all real numbers in the range (1,W ) by letting a cutoff j + λ, where λ ∈ (0, 1),
correspond to mixing between cutoff j and cutoff j + 1 with probabilities 1 − λ
and λ respectively.21
Cutoff strategies are not only intuitive, but they are also optimal strategies
for firms. Whenever other firms use anonymous strategies and workers signal to
their most preferred firms within blocks, for any strategy of firm f there exists
21This is equivalent to f making offers to Sf when Sf is ranked better than j, randomizing between
Tf and Sf when Sf has rank exactly j, and making offers to Tf otherwise.
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a cutoff strategy that provides firm f with a weakly higher expected payoff (see
Proposition A2 in the Appendix). To see this, note that firm and worker strategies
are anonymous, and the probability that firm f ’s offer to Tf or Sf will be accepted
depends only on the number of signals firm f receives, and not on the identity of
the signaling workers. Hence, if f finds it optimal to make an offer to Sf , it will
certainly make an offer to a more preferred Sf , provided the number of signals it
receives is the same. The equilibrium results in this paper will all involve firms
using cutoff strategies.
Since cutoff strategies can be represented by cutoff vectors, we can impose a
natural partial order on them: firm f ’s cutoff strategy σ′f is greater than cutoff
strategy σf if all cutoffs of σ
′
f are weakly greater than all cutoffs of σf and at
least one of them is strictly greater. We say that firm f responds more to signals
than firm f ′ when σf is greater than σf ′ .
We now examine how a firm should adjust its behavior in response to changes
in the behavior of opponents. We find that responding to signals is a case of
strategic complements.
PROPOSITION 3 (Strategic Complements): Suppose workers play symmetric
best-in-block strategies, all firms use cutoff strategies, and firm f uses a cutoff
strategy that is a best response. If one of the other firms increases its cutoffs
(responds more to signals), then the best response for firm f is also to increase
its cutoffs.
When other firms make offers to workers who have signaled to them, it is risky for
firm f to make an offer to a worker who has not signaled to it. Such a worker has
signaled to another firm, which is more inclined to make her an offer. The greater
this inclination on the part of the firm’s opponents, the riskier it is for firm f to
make an offer to its most preferred overall worker Tf . Hence as a response, firm
f is also more inclined to make an offer to its most preferred worker among those
who sent a signal, namely Sf .
The next result establishes the existence of equilibria in block correlated set-
tings in the offer game with signals. To prove the theorem, we first demonstrate
equilibrium existence while requiring firms to use only cutoff strategies. We then
invoke the optimality of cutoffs result to show that this step is not restrictive.
THEOREM 1 (Equilibrium Existence): There exists a block-symmetric equilib-
rium where 1) workers play symmetric best-in-block strategies, and 2) firms play
block-symmetric cutoff strategies.
Observe that when there is a single block of firms, we have an even sharper
characterization of equilibria. With one firm block, an optimal strategy for each
worker is to send a signal to her most preferred firm, for any anonymous firm
cutoff strategies. Fixing this behavior, we may then use the strategic comple-
ments property of Proposition 3 to cleanly apply Theorem 5 from Milgrom and
Roberts (1990). When there is a single block of firms, there exists a symmetric
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equilibrium in pure cutoff strategies where 1) workers signal to their most pre-
ferred firms and accept their best available offer and 2) firms use symmetric cutoff
strategies. Furthermore, there exist pure symmetric equilibria with smallest and
largest cutoffs. (See Theorem A1 in the Appendix for details).
IV. Welfare Effects of Introducing a Signaling Mechanism
We have analyzed the unique equilibrium in the offer game with no signals,
and we have studied block-symmetric equilibria in the offer game with a signal-
ing mechanism. In this section we address the effect of introducing a signaling
mechanism on the market outcome. We consider three outcome measures: the
number of matches in the market, the welfare of firms, and the welfare of workers.
For agent welfare comparisons we consider Pareto ex-ante expected utility as our
criterion. The expected welfare for a firm f and a worker w are captured by pif
and piw respectively, where pif , piw : (Σw)
W × (Σf )F × Θ → R. Let the function
m : (Σw)
W × (Σf )F × Θ → R denote the expected total number of matches in
the market as a function of agent strategies and types.
We can now state the result regarding the effect of adding a signaling mechanism
to an offer game with no signals. Note that for the comparisons in the theorem to
be strict, we require a block with at least two firms where in equilibrium, workers
send signals with positive probability to that block. Without this condition, we
only have weak comparisons.
THEOREM 2 (Welfare): Consider any nonbabbling block-symmetric equilibrium
of the offer game with signals, in which there is a block Fb with at least two firms
such that αb > 0. Then,
i. The expected number of matches is strictly greater than in the unique equi-
librium of the offer game with no signals.
ii. The expected welfare of workers is strictly greater than in the unique equi-
librium of the offer game with no signals.
iii. The welfare of firms may be greater or smaller than in the unique equilibrium
of the offer game with no signals.
The introduction of a signaling mechanism increases the expected number of
matches because firms, by responding to signals, make offers to workers who
are more likely to accept them. Furthermore, firms responding to signals also
unambiguously increase the expected welfare of workers because workers receive
offers from better firms and with higher probability.
In contrast, a firm responding to signals has a negative spillover on the welfare
of other firms in the same block. To see this, note that when a firm makes an
offer to a worker who has signaled it, any other firm in the same block planning
to make this worker an offer because it has ranked it highest despite not having
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received a signal, suddenly faces insurmountable competition. This logic illus-
trates that while there is an “information effect” where firms value signals which
help them assess which workers will accept offers, there is a potentially counter-
veiling “competition effect” where firm response to signals may negatively impact
the welfare of other firms. Either effect can dominate, explaining the ambiguous
impact of signaling on firm welfare (recall our example in Section I).
In a model with a single block of firms, we once again can make sharper predic-
tions. In addition to analyzing the effect of introducing a signaling mechanism, we
can also compare welfare across signaling equilibria. When multiple symmetric
equilibria exist, firms and workers are opposed in their preferences: workers prefer
the equilibrium that involves firms responding most to signals (greatest cutoffs),
while firms prefer the equilibrium where they respond least.
THEOREM 3 (Welfare: Single Block of Firms): Consider any two symmetric
cutoff strategy equilibria in the offer game with signals with one block of firms
where in one equilibrium firms have greater cutoffs (respond more to signals).
Compared to the equilibrium with lower cutoffs, in the equilibrium with greater
cutoffs we have the following: (i) the expected number of matches is weakly greater,
(ii) workers have weakly higher expected payoffs, and (iii) firms have weakly lower
expected payoffs.
Note that we cannot generalize this result to block-correlated markets. When a
single firm responds more to signals, firms in lower ranked blocks may benefit:
a low ranked firm making an offer to a worker who has signaled it will face less
competition when a higher ranked firm focuses on a (different) worker who has
signaled it. Hence, we no longer see a purely negative spillover on other firms.
V. Market Structure and The Value of a Signaling Mechanism
In this section, we analyze the effects of introducing a signaling mechanism
across different market structures. In particular, we focus our analysis on the
increase in the expected number of matches due to the introduction of a signaling
mechanism as we vary the relative size of the two sides of the market and the
number of periods of interaction.
To isolate the impact of a signaling mechanism on the number of matches in
the market, we consider a special case where agents want to match, but are nearly
indifferent over whom they match with. That is, firms and workers play an (al-
most) pure coordination game amongst themselves. Specifically, we consider the
cardinal utility from being matched to a partner as being almost the same across
partners. If agent a has a preference profile θa, agent a prefers to be matched with
partner θka , rather than with partner θ
k′
a , k
′ > k, though the difference between
utility intensities is very small.22 In addition, there is only one block of firms, so
22The “nearly indifferent” condition for firms is that u(W ) > W/F
(
1− (1− 1/W )F
)
u(1), where u(1)
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that agent preferences are uniformly distributed.23
Under these assumptions, there is a unique nonbabbling symmetric equilibrium
in the offer game with signals. Each worker sends a signal to her most preferred
firm. Each firm makes an offer to its most preferred worker that has signaled
provided the firm receives at least one signal; otherwise, it makes an offer to its
top-ranked worker (see Proposition B1 in the Online Appendix).24 Proposition 1
also applies in this setting; that is, there is a unique equilibrium of the offer game
with no signals.
We denote the expected number of matches in the unique equilibrium in the
pure coordination model with signals and with F firms andW workers asmS(F,W ),
and without a signaling mechanism as mNS(F,W ). The increase in expected
number of matches from the introduction of the signaling mechanism, which we
term the value of the signaling mechanism, we denote as V (F,W ) ≡ mS(F,W )−
mNS(F,W ).
A. Balanced Markets
In this subsection, we examine how the value of the signaling mechanism
changes for markets of various sizes. We begin with an illustration. Figure 2
graphs 100 · V (F,W )/W as a function of F for fixed W = 10 and W = 100, and
100 · V (F,W )/F as a function of W for fixed F = 10 and F = 100. That is, the
figure depicts the increase in the expected number of matches proportional to the
size of the side of the market we keep fixed (which places an upper bound on the
total number of possible matches).
The figures suggest that the value of a signaling mechanism is single peaked
when varying one side of the market and holding the other constant. In this
example, the signaling mechanism is most beneficial for balanced markets —
markets where the the number of firms and the number of workers are roughly
of the same magnitude. To understand why signaling may be particularly useful
in balanced markets, it is helpful to think about the endpoints. With many
workers and very few firms, firms will almost certainly match with or without the
and u(W ) are firm utility from matching with first and last ranked workers, respectively. A complete
specification of the setup can be found in the subsection “Market Structure and the Value of a Signaling
Mechanism” of the Online Appendix.
23Our pure coordination model has similarities to the “urn-ball” model in the labor literature, concisely
described in a survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001): “Firms play the role of urns and workers play
the role of balls. An urn becomes “productive” when it has ball in it. [. . . ] In the simplest version of
this process U workers know exactly the location of V job vacancies and send one application each. If a
vacancy receives one or more applications it selects an applicant at random and forms a match. The other
applicants are returned to the pool of unemployed workers to apply again.” Our pure coordination model
effectively flips the urn-ball problem around. Workers apply to all jobs, and firms propose the offers.
We have a nonrandom selection procedure, and of course in our model we study the role of signaling.
Perhaps the paper with the closest market structure to ours is Julien, Kennes and King (2000).
24In this case, one can view the offer game with no signals as the result of the first round of a firm-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. When workers send signals, the result resembles one round of
a worker-proposing deferred acceptance with one exception: firms who received no offer (no signal from
any worker) do get to make an offer.
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Figure 2. Balanced Markets
Note: The graph shows the proportional increase in the number of matches due to introducing a signaling
mechanism as we vary the number of firms for a fixed number of workers (left graphs) and vice versa
(right graphs).
signaling mechanism, as there is no large coordination problem. With many firms
and few workers, the reverse holds: most workers will get offers with or without
the signaling mechanism. Hence, the signaling mechanism offers little benefit at
the extremes. Furthermore, Figure 2 suggests that the proportional increase in
the expected number of matches remains steady as market size increases, holding
constant the ratio of workers to firms. Proposition 4 describes these observations
precisely.
PROPOSITION 4 (Balanced Markets): Consider markets with F firms and W
workers. Then (i) for fixed W , V (F,W ) attains its maximum value at F =
x0W + OW (1), where x0 ≈ 1.01211 and (ii) for fixed F , V (F,W ) attains its
maximum value at W = y0F +OF (1), where y0 ≈ 1.8442.
The proof of Proposition 4 involves the calculation of an explicit formula for
V (F,W ). The expected increase in the number of matches can be represented as
V (F,W ) = α(
W
F
)F +OF (1)
or as
V (F,W ) = β(
F
W
)W +OW (1),
where α(·) and β(·) are particular functions and OW (1) and OF (1) denote func-
tions that are smaller than a constant for large W and for large F respectively.
Hence, V (F,W ) is “almost” homogeneous of degree one for large markets. That is,
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the proportional increase in the number of matches, V (F,W )/W and V (F,W )/F ,
is almost homogenous of degree zero.25 As a consequence, we can evaluate the
introduction of the signaling mechanism for a sample market, and its properties
will be preserved for markets of other sizes, but with the same ratio of firms to
workers.
For example, we can use Figure 2 to investigate maximal quantitative gains
from the introduction of the signaling mechanism in large markets. For a fixed
number of workers, the maximum increase in expected number of matches is
approximately 15 percent. Furthermore, the returns to the signaling mechanism
are substantial over a wide range of market conditions. For example, only when
the number of firms outweighs the number of workers by more than fourfold do
the gains from introducing the signaling mechanism drop to below 1 percent.
B. Multiple Periods of Interaction
We now explore how the value of a signaling mechanism is impacted when
agents can interact in multiple periods. As in the general model, each worker can
send only one signal and has only one interview position to fill. However, we now
consider an offer game with L+ 1 periods, where workers send signals to firms in
period 0, while in the other L periods agents can interact and be matched. The
exact description of the game is as follows:
Period 0: Workers send signals.
1) Agents’ preferences are realized. Each worker decides whether to send a
signal and to which firm. Signals are sent simultaneously and are observed
only by firms who have received them.
Periods 1− L: Agents interact. Each period consists of two stages:
1) Each firm makes an offer to at most one worker; offers are made simultane-
ously.
2) Each worker accepts at most one offer from the set of offers she receives,
and rejects all other offers.
Offers cannot be deferred, and acceptance is binding. When a worker accepts an
offer, the firm-worker pair leaves the market, and this is observed by all agents.
Only the unmatched agents participate in the remaining periods. As a point of
comparison, we will also be interested in the L-period offer game with no signals,
which is identical to the game described above except that period 0 is excluded.
Finally, we assume a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) for being matched in later periods;
that is, a match in period period T reduces utility by a factor of δT−1.
25Note that this result corroborates the stylized fact in the empirical labor literature that the matching
function (the expected number of matches) has a constant return to scale. See, for example, Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) or Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005).
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Under the assumptions of the pure coordination model and with a sufficiently
small discount factor, there is no incentive to delay offers or acceptances, since
agents care (almost) only about being matched. There is a unique symmetric
sequential equilibrium in the offer game with no signals, where each firm makes
an offer to its most preferred worker and each worker accepts its best offer in each
period. Similarly, there is a unique symmetric sequential nonbabbling equilibrium
in the offer game with signals. Each worker sends her signal to her most preferred
firm in period 0. Each worker accepts the best available offer in each period. In
any period, each firm makes an offer to its most preferred worker (among those
remaining in the market) who has sent it a signal, provided such a worker exists.
Otherwise the firm makes an offer to its most preferred worker among those still in
the market (Proposition B2 in the Online Appendix proves these results formally).
We may now compare the offer game with and without the signaling mechanism
when there are multiple periods of interaction. Additional periods of interaction
provide an opportunity for a greater number firms and workers to be matched.
Therefore, the value of the signaling mechanism decreases as the number of peri-
ods of interaction increases. The next proposition shows this relationship formally.
PROPOSITION 5 (Multiple Periods): The expected increase in number of
matches from the introduction of the signaling mechanism, V L(F,W ), is a de-
creasing function of the number of periods of interactions, L.
The effect of multiple periods on the value of the signaling mechanism is intuitive:
the larger the number of periods, the lower the degree of market congestion, and
the lower the value of signaling. As a practical matter, however, this result has
important limitations. The result depends crucially on participants recognizing
who has left the market, information which in practice is often only slowly dis-
seminated. Extending the length of a market may also simply not be feasible.
Entry level labor markets often have fixed end dates, and each “period” involves
a high degree of organization. For example, adding a second ASSA meeting with
interviews would likely be unpalatable to hiring committees. Finally, extending
the market length can also have the effect of extending the time it takes to make
and respond to offers (c.f. Roth and Xing, 1997), so that the effective market
length remains short, and congestion remains. So while reducing congestion by
adding periods has theoretical promise, these limitations suggest that the value
of signaling will persist even in decentralized markets with longer timeframes.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
Excessive applications by job market candidates lead to market congestion:
employers must devote resources to evaluate and pursue potential candidates,
but cannot give due attention to all. Evaluation is further complicated because
employers must assess which applicants, many of whom are performing broad
searches, are likely to ultimately accept a job offer.
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Consequently, applicants are often eager to convey information about their
interest in particular employers, and employers stand ready to act upon such in-
formation, if it can be deemed credible. However, in many markets indicating
preferences is cheap, and employers may struggle to identify which preference
information is sincere. This, in turn, may prevent any potential gains from pref-
erence signaling from being realized.
In this paper we examined how a signaling mechanism can overcome this cred-
ibility problem and improve agent welfare. In our model, workers are allowed to
send a costless signal to a single firm. While participation is free and voluntary,
this mechanism nevertheless provides workers with a means of credibly expressing
preferences. In a setting where workers agree on the ranking of blocks of firms but
vary in their preferences within each block, workers will send their signal to their
most preferred firm in a block, mixing across blocks. Firms use this information
as guidance, optimally using cutoff strategies to make offers. We find that on
average, introducing a signaling technology increases both the expected number
of matches as well as the expected welfare of workers. The welfare of firms, on the
other hand, changes ambiguously, because firms responding more to signals may
impose a negative externality on other firms. We showed further that introducing
a signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets, that is, markets
in which the number of firms and the number of workers are of roughly the same
magnitude.
One path for future research would be to characterize the full set of agent pref-
erences where signaling is beneficial. While in this paper we find that signaling
mechanisms can improve agent welfare under a reasonably broad class of prefer-
ences, for some agent preferences signaling can worsen outcomes. Kushnir (2012)
models a high-information setting with minimal congestion where signals disturb
firms’ commonly held beliefs about workers preferences, which in turn disrupts
the maximal matching. Kushnir’s example corroborates the intuition that signals
may be more useful in low information settings than in high. Further investigation
of this question could be fruitful.
Another interesting question that is beyond the scope of the current paper
concerns the optimal signaling mechanism. Providing candidates with one, or else
a small number of identical signals offers a tractable approach, and participants
may value its simplicity. But within the realm of mechanisms that offer candidates
equal numbers of identical signals, how do we identify the optimal number of
signals, especially in light of the fact that multiple equilbria may exist? And
might we do even better?
If we expand the class of mechanisms under study, we can potentially improve
performance even more. For example, the signaling mechanism that maximizes
the number of matches may be asymmetric. Consider the example in Section I,
with two firms and two workers. In the example, each worker had exactly one
signal. If both workers have and send two signals that are identical, outcomes
are as if each had no signal. If we offered each worker two distinct signals, e.g. a
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‘gold’ and a ‘silver’ signal, analysis is as if they had one signal each.
Asymmetric signaling capacities, however, can generate a full matching. Sup-
pose that one worker has a gold signal, while the other has two silver signals.
Suppose further that firms are indifferent between the two workers. Then one
equilibrium involves the first worker sending its gold signal to its preferred firm.
The firm that receives the gold signal will make the signaling worker an offer,
while the firm who receives no gold signal will make an offer to the worker who
sent a silver signal. Both firms and workers will always be matched.
Signaling under general preferences, optimal signaling mechanisms, and the
benefits from signaling across market structures all offer exciting areas for future
research.
This work suggests that a signaling mechanism has the potential to improve
outcomes in congested markets. But importantly, since signaling mechanisms are
free, voluntary, and built on top of existing labor markets, these improvements
come in a reasonably noninvasive manner. As opposed to a central clearinghouse,
as in the National Resident Matching Program (see e.g. Roth, 1984 and Roth
and Peranson, 1999), a centralized signaling mechanism requires much less inter-
vention. Market designers may find it easier to get consensus from participants
to introduce such a mechanism, which nevertheless can offer significant benefits.
As such, we hope that in addition to furthering our understanding of how labor
markets work, our paper adds to the practical literature that aims at changing
and improving existing markets.
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Appendix
The appendix covers the proofs of the main theorems and propositions from
Sections III and IV. We also introduce Propositions A1 and A2 as well as Theorem
A1 which formalize statements made in the text, and are building blocks for the
main results. Proofs for these propositions are in the Web part of the Appendix.
PROPOSITION A1 (Binary Nature of Optimal Firm Offer): Suppose firms −f
use anonymous strategies and workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies. Con-
sider a firm f that receives signals from workers WS ⊂ W∪N . Then the expected
payoff to f from making an offer to Sf is strictly greater than the payoff from
making an offer to any other worker in WS . The expected payoff to firm f from
making an offer to Tf is strictly greater than the payoff from making an offer to
any other worker from set W\WS .
PROPOSITION A2 (Optimality of Cutoff Strategies): Suppose workers use sym-
metric best-in-block strategies and firms have best-in-block beliefs. Then for any
strategy σf of firm f , there exists a cutoff strategy that provides f with a weakly
higher expected payoff than σf for any anonymous strategies σ−f of opponent
firms −f .
THEOREM A1 (Equilibrium Existence: Single Block of Firms): In the offer
game with signals with single block of firms, there exists a symmetric equilibrium
in pure cutoff strategies where 1) workers signal to their most preferred firms and
accept their best available offer and 2) firms use symmetric cutoff strategies. Fur-
thermore, there exist pure symmetric equilibria with smallest and largest cutoffs.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Equilibrium with No Signals). Consider some agent
preference profile θ ∈ Θ. We will compare two strategies for firm f given its profile
of preferences θf : strategy σf of making an offer to its top worker, and strategy
σ′f of making an offer to its nth ranked worker, n > 1. We have σf (θ) = θ
1
f ≡ w
and σ′f (θ) = θ
n
f ≡ wn. We will show that for any anonymous strategies σ−f of
opponent firms −f , these two strategies yield identical probabilities of f being
matched, so that f optimally makes its offer to its most preferred worker. The
proposition straightforwardly follows.
Denote a permutation that changes the ranks of w and wn in a firm preference
list (or profile of firm preference lists) as ρ : (..., w, ..., wn, ...) −→ (..., wn, ..., w, ...).
We now construct preference profile θ′ ∈ Θ from θ as follows:
• firm f ’s preferences are the same as in θ : θ′f = θf ,
• workers w and wn are exchanged in the preference lists of firms −f : ∀f ′ ∈
−f, we have θ′f ′ = ρ(θf ′)
• worker w and worker wn preference profiles are exchanged: θ′w = θwn ,
θ′wn = θw, and
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• θw′ = θ′w′ for any other w′ ∈ W \{w,wn}.
Define function mf : (Σw)
W × (Σf )F ×Θ→ R as the probability of firm f being
matched as a function of agent strategies and types. Since firm −f strategies are
anonymous we have
σ−f (θ′−f ) = σ−f (ρ(θ−f )) = ρ (σ−f (θ−f ))
Therefore, the probability of firm f ′, f ′ ∈ −f, making an offer to worker w
for profile θ equals the probability of making an offer to worker wn for profile
θ′. Moreover, since we exchange worker w and wn preference lists for profile
θ′, whenever it is optimal for worker w to accept firm f offer for profile θ, it is
optimal for worker wn to accept firm f ′s offer for profile θ′. Therefore,
mf (σf , σ−f ,θ) = mf (σ′f , σ−f ,θ
′)
In other words, given θf , for each θ−f there exists θ′−f such that the probability
of f ’s offer to θ1f being accepted when opponent preferences are θ−f equals the
probability of f ’s offer to θnf being accepted when opponent preferences are θ
′
−f .26
Moreover θ′−f is different for different θ−f by construction. Since θ−f and θ
′
−f
are equally likely, we have
Eθ−fmf (σf , σ−f ,θ |θf ) = Eθ−fmf (σ′f , σ−f ,θ |θf )
and
Eθ mf (σf , σ−f ,θ) = Eθ mf (σ′f , σ−f ,θ).
That is, the expected probability of getting a match from firm f ’s top choice
equals the expected probability of getting a match from firm f ’s nth ranked
choice. Since the utility from obtaining a top match is greater, the strategy of
firm f of making an offer to its top worker is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Worker Strategies). We first define an analog of crite-
rion D1 of Cho and Kreps (1987) for our setting. Consider some block-symmetric
sequential equilibrium. Fix strategies of all agents except worker w and firm f,
which we denote as σ−f,w. Fix also the beliefs of firms other than firm f , denoted
as µ−f . We now analyze strategies of w and strategies and beliefs of f .
There are two cases where information sets for firms might be reached with
zero probability (lie “off the equilibrium path”) in a block-symmetric equilibrium.
First, when the symmetric worker equilibrium strategy prescribes zero probability
of sending a signal to a particular block, firms in these blocks would view signals
from such workers as “unexpected.” Second, when a firm anticipates receiving
26In this context, θ−f is a preference profile for all agents – both workers and firms – other than f .
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a signal with 100 percent probability, then not receiving a signal would corre-
spond to an off-equilibrium information set. But by the anonymous strategies
assumption, this can only happen in a block-symmetric equilibrium if the firm is
the only one in its block. In this case, the symmetry of worker strategies would
ensure that all workers send their signals to this firm with probability 1. Since
signals then would not transmit information about worker types, this equilibrium
is outcome equivalent to a babbling equilibrium. We will concentrate on the first
type of off-equilibrium messages – “unexpected” signals.
Consider firm f ’s decision at some information set that includes a (hypothetical,
off-equilibrium) signal from worker w. Denote the expected equilibrium payoffs of
firm f and worker w as u∗f and u
∗
w. For each possible type θ¯ ∈ Θf for firm f and
each set of signals that firm f could receive, we denote the mixed best response
of firm f that has beliefs µ¯ as MBRf (θ¯,WS ∪ w, µ¯) that by definition equals
arg maxσf∈Σf Eθ−f (pif (σf , σ−f ,θ) | θf = θ¯, WSf =WS ∪ w, µf = µ¯).
We then denote the mixed best response of firm f for all possible types and all
possible profiles of signals it may receive conditional on receiving w’s signal as
MBRf (w, µ¯) = {MBRf (θ¯,WS ∪ w, µ¯) for all θ¯ ∈ Θf , WS ⊂ W ∪N}.
We denote the set of best responses of firm f to probability assessments concen-
trated on set Ω ⊂ Θw as
MBRf (w,Ω) =
⋃
{µf :µf (Ω)=1}
MBRf (w, µf ).
Denote for any worker’s type t ∈ Θw
Dt = {φ ∈MBRf (w,Θw) : u∗w(t) < Eθ−w(piw(σw, φ, σ−w,f ,θ) | θw = t)}
D0t = {φ ∈MBRf (w,Θw) : u∗w(t) = Eθ−w(piw(σw, φ, σ−w,f ,θ) | θw = t)}.
Intuitively, set Dt (D
0
t ) is the set of firm f strategies (consistent with f best
responding to strategies of firms −f and to some set of beliefs that places weight
1 on w signaling f) such that by signaling f , worker w of type t would receive an
expected payoff greater than (equal to) her equilibrium payoff. We say that type
t may be pruned from firm f ’s beliefs if firm f ’s off-equilibrium beliefs place zero
probability on worker w being type t (upon f receiving a signal from her). Using
the above notation, we now state our analog of criterion D1 as follows:
CRITERION D1. Fix strategies of workers −w and strategies and beliefs of firms
−f . If for type t ∈ Θw of worker w there exists a type t′ ∈ Θw with Dt∪D0t ⊆ Dt′,
then t may be pruned from the domain of firm f ’s beliefs.
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The intuition behind this criterion is that whenever type t of worker w either
wishes to defect and send an off-equilibrium signal to firm f or is indifferent,
some other type t′ of worker w strictly wishes to defect. When we prune t for w
from firm f ’s beliefs, we are interpreting that firm f finds it infinitely more likely
that the off-equilibrium signal has come from type t′ than from type t.
We first show that there cannot be a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium
that satisfies Criterion D1 where sending a signal to a firm in some block Fb,
b ∈ {1, ..., B} reduces the likelihood of receiving an offer, i.e. psb < pnsb .
Let us assume that such a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium exists. If
there are at least two workers, agents use anonymous block-symmetric strategies,
and agents’ types are uncorrelated, each worker is unmatched with positive prob-
ability. Then in equilibrium, certainly no worker sends her signal to a firm within
block Fb; she’d prefer to simply send no signal at all. Hence, it must be that a
signal would reduce the probability of an offer for firms in some block not signaled
in equilibrium. Following the definition of Dt, whenever it would be beneficial for
some type θw ∈ Θw to deviate from the equilibrium path and send her signal to
firm f (which would require firm f making an offer to worker w), then it would
be beneficial for any type θ′w ∈ Θw of worker w such that firm f is w’s most
preferred firm within block Fb, to similarly deviate. Therefore, the only types
(preference profiles) of worker w that are not pruned in firms’ beliefs according to
Criterion D1 are those where firm f is w’s most preferred firm within block Fb.
Hence, given these beliefs, if it is optimal for firm f to make an offer to worker w
when it does not receive a signal from her, it is optimal for firm f to make an offer
to worker w when it receives her signal. This contradicts our initial assumption,
and hence psb0 < p
ns
b0
cannot be part of a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium
that satisfies Criterion D1.
We have established that psb ≥ pnsb for each b = 1, ..., B. It is easy to observe
that there exists a block-symmetric sequential equilibrium that satisfies Criterion
D1 where for any b = 1, ..., B, psb = p
ns
b . For example, each worker may randomize
her signal across all firms with equal probability, independently of her preferences,
and firms simply play the equilibrium strategies of the offer game with no signals.
The equilibrium beliefs are trivially block-uniform since when a firm receives a
signal from worker w, its beliefs coincide with the priors. Since all blocks are
reached with positive probability in equilibrium, no off-equilibrium beliefs need
be specified, and the equilibrium satisfies Criterion D1.
Let us now consider the case when there exists b0 ∈ {1, ..., B}, such that psb0 >
pnsb0 in some block-symmetric sequential equilibrium. Recall that the equilibrium
probability that a worker sends her signal to a firm within block Fb is denoted
as αb, where αb ∈ [0, 1] and
∑B
b=1 αb ≤ 1. Let us consider some block Fb(6= Fb0)
such that αb > 0. As mentioned, if there are at least two workers, agents use
anonymous block-symmetric strategies, and agents’ types are uncorrelated, each
worker is unmatched with positive probability in equilibrium. Therefore, αb > 0
and psb = p
ns
b are incompatible in an equilibrium (worker w can benefit by signaling
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to block Fb0 rather than block Fb). Hence, if psb > pnsb then if worker w plans to
send a signal to a firm in Fb, it should be to her most preferred firm within this
block, as this delivers the greatest expected payoff to her.
Now suppose there is some block Fb′ , b′ ∈ {1, ..., B}, such that αb′ = 0. Con-
sider the decision of some firm f ∈ Fb′ at an information set that includes a
(hypothetical, off-equilibrium) signal from worker w. We have two cases: either
there exists type t ∈ Θw of worker w such that Dt 6= ∅, or else for any type
t ∈ Θw, Dt = ∅.
We will first rule out the former case. Suppose there exists type t ∈ Θw of
worker w such that Dt 6= ∅. That is, if worker w sends a signal to firm f , there
exists a “reasonable” firm f strategy that delivers expected payoff to worker w
of type t greater than her equilibrium payoff. However, any firm f offer that
delivers payoff exceeding equilibrium payoff for worker w of type t, also delivers
payoff exceeding equilibrium payoff for a worker w of type t′ which prefers firm f
to any other firm in block Fb′ . Therefore, the only firm f off-equilibrium beliefs
that survive Criterion D1 are such that
(A1) µf ({θw ∈ Θw : f = max
θw
(f ′ ∈ Fb′)} |w ⊂ WSf ) = 1.
But since Dt′ and D
0
t′ consist of firm f best responses, it is optimal for firm f to
indeed make an offer to worker w upon receiving her signal, provided f ’s beliefs
are restricted to (A1). This means that the equilibrium strategy of worker w of
type t′ (not sending a signal to firm f) is not optimal if firm f has beliefs (A1).
Therefore, there cannot exist type t ∈ Θw of worker w such that Dt 6= ∅.
Let us now consider the case where for any type t ∈ Θw, we have Dt = ∅. That
is, it is never beneficial for any type of worker to send an off-equilibrium signal,
as no reasonable offers can be expected for any firm beliefs. Therefore, αb′ = 0
is an equilibrium strategy for worker w independently of off-equilibrium beliefs
of firm f . In particular, worker w’s strategy is optimal for any off-equilibrium
beliefs of firms in block Fb′ , even if each firm f has the most favorable possible
beliefs about worker w, such as in (A1).
Note that if there are at least two workers, the interaction between worker w
and some firm f (fixing the strategies and beliefs of other agents) is a monotonic
signaling game of Cho and Sobel (1990). The assumption of monotonicity is sat-
isfied in our environment because each type of worker w prefers the same action
of firm f , i.e. firm f making an offer to worker w. As a consequence, Criterion
D1 is equivalent to “never a weak best response” of Cho and Kreps (1987) and
“universal divinity” of Banks and Sobel (1987) in our setting. More detailed dis-
cussion of monotonic signaling games can be found in Cho and Sobel (1990).
Proof of Proposition 3 (Strategic Complements). Consider some firm f from
some block Fb, b ∈ {1, ..., B}. We consider two strategy profiles, σ−f and σ′−f , for
firms −f that vary only in the strategy for firm f ′ . For simplicity, we assume
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that σ′f ′ differs from σf ′ only for profile θ¯f ′ and set of received signals WSf ′
σf ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = αSf ′ + (1− α)Tf ′
σ′f ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = α′Sf ′ + (1− α′)Tf ′
such that α′ > α. Formally, this means σ′f is not a cutoff strategy, because a cutoff
strategy requires the same behavior for any profile of preferences (anonymity)
when firms receive the same number of signals. We will prove the statement using
our simplifying assumption about strategies for firms −f , and the extension to
the full proposition follows from iterated application of this result.
Consider some realized firm f preference profile θ∗f ∈ Θ and some set of signals
WS ⊂ W ∪N . We want to show that firm f ’s payoff from making an offer to Tf
(weakly) decreases whereas firm f ’s payoff from making an offer to Sf (weakly)
increases when firm f ′ responds more to signals, i.e. plays strategy σ′f ′ instead of
σf ′ . That is,
I) Eθ(pif (Tf , σ−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≥
Eθ(pif (Tf , σ′−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS)
II) Eθ(pif (Sf , σ−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≤
Eθ(pif (Sf , σ′−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS).
Since firm f ’s offer can only be either accepted or declined, the above statements
are equivalent to
I) Eθ(mf (Tf , σ−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≥
Eθ(mf (Tf , σ′−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS)
II) Eθ(mf (Sf , σ−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≤
Eθ(mf (Sf , σ′−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS).
That is, we wish to show that the probability of being matched to Tf weakly
decreases, and the probability of being matched to Sf weakly increases.
We first prove I). Define sets of agent profiles that lead to an increase and a
decrease in the probability of getting a match given the change in f ′ strategy as
Θ¯+ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ |θf = θ∗f , WSf =WS and mf (Tf , σ−f ,θ) < mf (Tf , σ′−f ,θ)}
Θ¯− ≡ {θ ∈ Θ |θf = θ∗f , WSf =WS and mf (Tf , σ−f ,θ) > mf (Tf , σ′−f ,θ)}
respectively. If set Θ¯+ is empty, the statement has been proved. Otherwise, select
arbitrary θ ∈ Θ¯+ and denote Tf ≡ w. Since the change of f ′ strategy pivotally
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reduces competition to f ’s offer to w in this case, we must have Tf ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = w
and Sf ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = w′ 6= w, and
σf ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = αw′ + (1− α)w
σ′f ′(θ¯f ′ ,WSf ′) = α′w′ + (1− α′)w.
Note that it cannot be that firm f is from a higher ranked block than firm f ′ , i.e.
f ′ ∈ Fb′ where b′ > b. If f were from a higher ranked block, an offer from firm f ′
is always worse than the offer of firm f and could not influence the probability
that firm f obtains a match. Therefore, firm f is from a block that is weakly
worse than Fb′ , i.e. b′ ≤ b.
Note that under θ, worker w has sent a signal neither to firm f nor to firm f ′.
This will allow us to construct element θ′ ∈ Θ¯−. Consider a permutation that
changes the ranks of w and w′ in a firm preference profile ρ : (..., w, ..., w′, ...) →
(..., w′, ..., w, ...). For any profile θ ∈ Θ¯+ we construct profile θ′ ∈ Θ as follows:
• θ′f = θ∗f
• ranks of workers w and w′ are exchanged in the preference lists of firms −f :
for each firm f ′ ∈ −f, θ′f ′ = ρ(θf ′)
• workers w and w′ preference profiles are exchanged: θ′w = θw′ , θ′w′ = θw,
• for any other w0 ∈ W\{w,w′}, θw0 = θ
′
w0 .
Note that under θ and θ′, firm f has the same preferences θ∗f and receives the
same set of signals. Since firm strategies are anonymous we have that
σf ′(θ
′
f ′ ,WS
′
f ′ ) = σf ′(ρ(θf ′), ρ(WSf ′)) (by our construction)
= αρ(w′) + (1− α)ρ(w) (by anonymity)
= αw + (1− α)w′
and similarly
σ′f ′(θ
′
f ′ ,WS
′
f ′ ) = α
′w + (1− α′)w′.
We will now argue that θ′ ∈ Θ¯−. Since θ ∈ Θ¯+, the strategy change for firm f ′
reduces the likelihood of firm f being matched with worker w (when f makes Tf
an offer under profile θ). Under profile θ′, firm f ′ makes an offer to worker w
more frequently when using strategy σ′f ′ rather than σf ′ . Furthermore, worker w
prefers firm f ′ to firm f under profile θ′. (We have already shown that f ′ cannot
be in a lower ranked block than f . If firm f ′ is in a higher ranked block Fb′ ,
b > b′, worker w always prefers firm f ′ to firm f . If firm f and firm f ′ are from
the same block, b = b′, worker w prefers f to f ′, since worker w sends a signal to
firm f ′ under profile θ′).
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To finish our proof, we must also investigate the behavior of a firm that receives
worker w’s signal for profile θ, say firm fy. If firm fy makes an offer to worker w
for profile θ, since the change of firm f ′ strategy changes firm f ’s payoff, firm fy
must be lower ranked than both firms f and f ′ in worker w’s preferences. Hence,
firm fy’s offer cannot change the action of worker w. If worker w
′ sends her signal
to firm fy then firm fy either makes an offer to worker w
′ or to worker Tfy , which
are both different from worker w.
Hence, firm fy does not influence the behavior of the agents in question, and
the overall probability that firm f ’s offer to worker w is accepted is smaller when
firm f ′ uses strategy σ′f ′ rather than σf ′ . That is, θ
′ ∈ Θ¯−.
Note that the above construction gives different profiles in Θ¯+ for different
profiles of Θ¯−. Hence, our construction is an injective function from Θ¯+ to Θ¯−,
so
∣∣Θ¯−∣∣ > ∣∣Θ¯+∣∣.27 Since profiles θ and θ′ are equally likely, we have
Eθ(mf (Tf , σ−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≥
Eθ(mf (Tf , σ′−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS)
We now prove inequality II). That is, we will show that if firm f ′ responds
more to signals, the probability of firm f being matched to Sf (upon making Sf
an offer) weakly increases. If firm f, f ∈ Fb, receives a signal from worker w it
believes it is the best firm in block Fb according to worker w’s preferences. That
is, worker w prefers the offer of firm f to an offer from any other firm f ′ from any
block Fb′ with b′ ≥ b. Therefore, the change of the behavior of any firm f ′ from
block Fb′ , b′ ≥ b, does not influence firm f ’s payoff.
Firm f ′ from group Fb′ , b′ < b, can draw away worker w’s offer from firm f
only if it makes an offer to worker w. However, firm f ′ makes an offer to worker
w, conditionally on firm f receiving a signal from worker w, only when worker w
is Tf ′ . However, if firm f
′ responds more to signals, it makes an offer to its Tf
more rarely. This means that firm f ′ draws worker w away from firm f less often.
Therefore, the probability that firm f ’s offer is accepted by Sf increases:
Eθ(mf (Sf , σ−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS) ≤
Eθ(mf (Sf , σ′−f ,θ) |θf = θ∗f ,WSf =WS)
As a corollary of I) and II), if firm f ′ increases its cutoff point for some set of sig-
nals, firm f will also optimally (weakly) increase its cutoff points. The above logic
is valid for the change of cutoff points for any set of signals of the same size and
any profile of preferences, so the statement of the proposition immediately follows.
27One may show by example that this is not, in general, a bijection.
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Proof of Theorem 1 (Equilibrium Existence). We first prove the theorem while
requiring that firms use cutoff strategies and have best-in-block beliefs, and that
workers use best-in-block strategies. We then show that this assumption is not
restrictive. Denote a typical such strategy profile as σ = (σF ,σW ) that consists
of firm cutoff strategies σF = (σf1 , ..., σfF ) and worker best-in-block strategies
strategies σW = (σw1 , ..., σwW ).
Denote by Uw(σw, σ−w) the expected payoff of worker w when she uses best-in-
block strategy σw and the other agents use strategies σ−w. Denote by Uf (σf , σ−f )
the expected payoff of firm f when it uses strategy σf and the other agents use
strategies σ−f . Note that Uw and Uf are continuous, as firms and workers mix
over a finite set of strategies.
Denote firm f ’s best reply correspondence by gf , which maps each strategy
profile σ to the set of mixed strategies that maximize f ’s payoff when opponents
(firms and workers included) play σ−f . Denote the analogous best reply corre-
spondence for worker w as gw. Recall that agent preferences are block-symmetric.
Hence, if gf (σ) are best reply strategies to some block-symmetric profile σ for
firm f , they are best reply strategies for any firm from the same block. Similarly,
if gw(σ) are best reply strategies to some block-symmetric profile σ, they are best
reply strategies for any worker. Hence, we consider the best reply correspondence
from the set of block-symmetric profiles to the set of block symmetric profiles,
denoted by g = (gf1 , ..., gfF , gw1 , ..., gwW ), where if f and f
′ are from the same
block then gf = gf ′ and for any w and w
′ we have gw = gw′ .
We now invoke Kakutani’s theorem (Kakutani, 1941) to establish the existence
of a block-symmetric equilibrium. Note first that the set of block-symmetric
mixed-strategy profiles is a compact, convex, and nonempty subset of a finite-
dimensional Euclidean space. Since the arguments of g are mixed strategies, we
have that g is nonempty and convex over all block-symmetric profiles σ (see e.g.
the logic in Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.29-30). The final condition we need to
apply Kakutani’s theorem is that g has a closed graph. By way of contradiction,
assume g does not have a closed graph, so that there is a sequence (σn, σˆn) →
(σ, σˆ) such that σn and σˆn are block-symmetric and σˆn ∈ g(σn), but σˆ /∈ g(σ).
Then there exists i ∈ F∪W such that σˆi /∈ gi(σ). Hence, we can find ε and σ′i such
that Ui(σ
′
i, σ−i) > Ui(σˆi, σ−i)+3ε. Since Ui is continuous and (σ
n, σˆn)→ (σ, σˆ),
then for n sufficiently large we have
Ui(σ
′
i, σ
n
−i) > Ui(σ
′
i, σ−i)− ε > Ui(σˆi, σ−i) + 2ε > Ui(σˆni, σn−i) + ε,
which is a contradiction to σˆni being a best reply to σ
n. Hence, g has a closed
graph and we can apply Kakutani’s theorem to establish the existence of a fixed
point of g.
Until now we have required cutoff strategies and best-in-block beliefs for firms,
and best-in-block strategies for workers. Consider any block-symmetric profile of
strategies that is a fixed point of g. Since firms use block-symmetric strategies in
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this profile, Proposition 2 allows us to conclude that best-in-block strategies are
optimal for workers even if we expanded the worker strategy space to include all
strategies. Since workers use best-in-block strategies for this profile, firms holding
best-in-block beliefs is indeed consistent. Finally, by Proposition A2 we see that
firm cutoff strategies are optimal even if we allow any firm deviations, not simply
deviations in cutoff strategies. Hence, we have established the existence of an
equilibrium when workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies and firms use
symmetric cutoff strategies and have best-in-block beliefs.
Proof of Theorem 2 (Welfare). We will use following lemma, proved in the
Online Appendix.
LEMMA A1 (Incremental welfare): Assume firms use cutoff strategies and work-
ers use best-in-block strategies. Fix the strategies of firms −f as σ−f . Let
firm f ’s strategy σf differ from σ
′
f only in that σ
′
f has greater cutoffs (more
response more to signals). Then Eθ(m(σ′f , σ−f ,θ)) ≥ Eθ(m(σf , σ−f ,θ)) and
Eθ(piw(σ′f , σ−f ,θ)) ≥ Eθ(piw(σf , σ−f ,θ)).
Let us denote firm strategies in the unique equilibrium of the offer game with
no signals as σ0F . Now consider a block-symmetric equilibrium of the offer game
with signals when agent use strategies (σF ,σW ). If agents employ strategies
(σ0F ,σW ), the expected number of matches and the welfare of workers equal the
corresponding parameters in the offer game with no signals. Therefore, the result
that the expected number of matches and the expected welfare of workers in a
block-symmetric equilibrium in the offer game with signals are weakly greater
than the corresponding parameters in the unique equilibrium of the offer game
with no signals is a consequence of sequential application of Lemma A1.
Let us now consider a nonbabbling block-symmetric equilibrium (σF ,σW ) of
the offer game with signals such that there exists block Fb with at least two firms
where αb > 0. Proposition 2 shows that firms from block Fb respond to signals
in the equilibrium, i.e. make offers to signaling workers with positive probability
so that psb > p
ns
b .
Select some firm f from block Fb. Using a construction similar to that in the
proof of Lemma A1 we consider two sets of preference profiles:
Θ¯+ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | m(σ0f , σ−f ,θ) < m(σf , σ−f ,θ)}
Θ¯− ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | m(σ0f , σ−f ,θ) > m(σf , σ−f ,θ)}.
Consider some realized profile of preferences, θ ∈ Θ, and denote Tf = w′ and
Sf = w. Define mapping ψ : Θ→ Θ so that ψ(θ) is the profile in which workers
have preferences as in θ, but firms −f all swap the positions of workers w′ and w
in their preference lists. Note that ψ(ψ(θ)) = θ and ψ is a bijection on Θ. The
proof of of Lemma A1 establishes that |Θ¯+| ≥ |Θ¯−| and that for any θ ∈ Θ¯−,
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ψ(θ) ∈ Θ. Let us now show that the inequality is actually strict, i.e. there exist
θ ∈ Θ¯+ such that ψ(θ) /∈ Θ¯−.
There are at least two firms, f and f ′, in block Fb that respond to signals.
Consider some profile θ from Θ¯+. We again denote Tf = w
′ and Sf = w.
Therefore, worker w does not have an offer from any other firm for profile θ from
Θ¯+, but worker w
′ has at least two offers. Since worker w′ sends her signal to
firm f ′ with positive probability and firm f ′ responds to signals, i.e. makes offers
to its top signaling workers, there exist θ∗ ∈ Θ¯+ such that worker w′ is the top
signaling worker of firm f ′, and firm f ′ makes an offer to worker w′.
However, worker w for profile ψ(θ∗) does not have any other offer, because she
is neither Tf nor Sf for profile ψ(θ
∗). Therefore, ψ(θ∗) cannot belong to Θ¯−.
Therefore, we have found a profile from Θ¯+ that does not belong to Θ¯−. As a
result, |Θ¯+| > |Θ¯−| and we have that
Eθ[m(σ0f , σ−f ,θ)] < Eθ[m(σf , σ−f ,θ)]
In addition, we know that Eθ[m(σ0f , σ0−f ,θ)] ≤ Eθ[m(σ0f , σ−f ,θ)], which gives us
Eθ[m(σ0f , σ0−f ,θ)] < Eθ[m(σf , σ−f ,θ)]
Overall, the expected number of matches in the offer game with signals when
agents use strategies (σF ,σW ) is strictly greater than the expected number of
matches in the offer game with no signals.
Using the above construction and the logic of the proof of Lemma A1 we obtain
the result for worker welfare. The example presented in Section I illustrates that
signals can ambiguously influence the welfare of firms. Specifically, Table 2 shows
that firm welfare increases upon introduction of a signaling mechanism only if the
value of a second ranked worker is sufficiently high, in this case when x > 0.5.
Proof of Theorem 3 (Welfare: Single Block of Firms). We first consider any
strategy profile in which firms use cutoff strategies, workers send signals to their
most preferred firms, and workers accept their best available offer. Fix the strate-
gies of all firms but f as σ−f . Let firm f ’s strategy σ′f differ from σf only in that
σ′f responds more to signals, that is, has higher cutoffs than σf . Lemma A1
shows that the expected number of matches and the expected payoff of each
worker w increases if firm f responds more to signals, i.e. Eθ[m(σ′f , σ−f ,θ) ] ≥
Eθ[m(σf , σ−f ,θ) ] and Eθ[piw(σ′f , σ−f ,θ) ] ≥ Eθ[piw(σf , σ−f ,θ) ].
Let us now show that firm f responding more to signals generates a negative
spillover on opponent firms. That is, for each f ′ ∈ −f ,
Eθ[pif ′(σ′f , σ−f ,θ) ] ≤ Eθ[pif ′(σf , σ−f ,θ) ]
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Let firm f strategy σf differ from σ
′
f in that σ
′
f has weakly greater cutoffs.
Consider some firm f ′ ∈ −f . For each preference list θf ′ and set of signals received
WS , firm f ′ either makes an offer to Sf ′(θf ′ ,WS) or Tf ′(θf ′ ,WS). Observe that
a change in strategy of firm f does not affect f ′’s payoff from making Sf ′ an offer.
This follows since each worker sends her signal to her most preferred firm, so
offers to signaling workers are always accepted. However, as shown in the proof
of Proposition 3, the probability that Tf ′ accepts firm f
′’s offer weakly decreases.
Hence, overall the expected payoff of firm f ′ ∈ −f weakly decreases when firm f
responds more to signals: Eθ(pif ′(σf , σ−f ,θ)) ≥ Eθ(pif ′(σ′f , σ−f ,θ)).
That the expected number of matches and the expected welfare of workers are
higher in the equilibrium with higher cutoffs is a straightforward consequence of
iterated application of the first and the second results above. In order to show that
firms have lower expected payoffs in the equilibrium with greater cutoffs, we com-
bine the third result with a simple equilibrium property. Consider two symmetric
equilibria, where firms play cutoff strategies σ and σ′, with σ′ ≥ σ. From the def-
inition of an equilibrium strategy we have Eθ[pif (σf , σ−f ,θ)] ≥ Eθ[pif (σ′f , σ−f ,θ)].
The third result yields Eθ[pif (σ′f , σ−f ,θ)] ≥ Eθ[pif (σ′f , σ′−f ,θ)]. Combining these
inequalities yields Eθ[pif (σf , σ−f ,θ)] ≥ Eθ[pif (σ′f , σ′−f ,θ)].
*
REFERENCES
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila, Yeon-Koo Che, and Yosuke Yasuda. 2012. “Ex-
panding ’Choice’ in School Choice.” Unpublished.
Avery, Christopher, and Jonathan Levin. 2010. “Early Admissions at Se-
lective Colleges.” American Economic Review, 100(5): 2125–2156.
Avery, Christopher, Andrew Fairbanks, and Richard Zeckhauser. 2003.
The Early Admissions Game: Joining the Elite. Harvard University Press.
Banks, Jeffrey S., and Joel Sobel. 1987. “Equilibrium Selection in Signaling
Games.” Econometrica, 55(3): 647–661.
Cho, In-Koo, and David Kreps. 1987. “Signaling Games and Stable Equilib-
ria.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2): 179–221.
Cho, In-Koo, and Joel Sobel. 1990. “Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in
Signaling Games.” Journal of Economic Theory, 50(2): 381–413.
Coles, Peter, John Cawley, Phillip B. Levine, Muriel Niederle, Alvin E.
Roth, and John J. Siegfried. 2010. “The Job Market for New Economists:
A Market Design Perspective.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(4): 187–
206.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE PREFERENCE SIGNALING 37
Crawford, Vincent, and Joel Sobel. 1982. “Strategic Information Transmis-
sion.” Econometrica, 50(6): 1431–1451.
Damiano, Ettore, and Hao Li. 2007. “Price Discrimination and Efficient
Matching.” Economic Theory, 30(2): 243–263.
Ely, Jeffrey, and Ron Siegel. 2012. “Adverse Selection and Unraveling in
Common-Value Labor Markets.” Unpublished.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. MIT Press.
Galenianos, Manolis, and Philipp Kircher. 2012. “On the Game-Theoretic
Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium.” International Economic Re-
view, 53(1): 1–21.
Hopkins, Ed. 2012. “Job Market Signalling of Relative Position, or Becker Mar-
ried to Spence.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 10: 290–322.
Hoppe, Heidrun C., Benny Moldovanu, and Aner Sela. 2009. “The Theory
of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals.” The Review of Economic
Studies, 76(1): 253–281.
Julien, Benoit, John Kennes, and Ian King. 2000. “Bidding for Labor.”
Review of Economic Dynamics, 3(4): 619–649.
Kakutani, Sizuo. 1941. “A generalization of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.”
Duke Mathematical Journal, 8(3): 457–459.
Kircher, Philipp. 2009. “Efficiency of Simultaneous Search.” Journal of Political
Economy, 117(5): 861–913.
Kushnir, Alexey. 2012. “Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets.” Unpub-
lished.
Lee, Robin, and Michael Schwarz. 2007. “Signaling Preferences in Interview-
ing Markets.” In Computational Social Systems and the Internet. , ed. Rudolf
Muller Eva Tardos Cramton, Peter and Moshe Tennenholtz.
Lee, Soohyung, Muriel Niederle, Hye-Rim Kim, and Woo-Keum Kim.
2011. “Propose with a Rose? Signaling in Internet Dating Markets.” NBER
Working paper 17340.
Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1990. “Rationalizability, Learning,
and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities.” Econometrica,
58(6): 1255–77.
Montgomery, James D. 1991. “Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry
Wage Differentials.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(1): 163.
Parendo, Shane. 2010. “Costless Signaling in Matching Markets.” Unpublished.
38 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
Peters, Michael. 1991. “Ex ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady
States.” Econometrica, 1425–1454.
Petrongolo, Barbara, and Christopher A. Pissarides. 2001. “Looking into
the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function.” Journal of Economic
Literature, 39(2): 390–431.
Rogerson, Richard, Robert Shimer, and Randall Wright. 2005. “Search-
Theoretic Models of the Labor Market: A Survey.” Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, 43(4): 959–988.
Roth, Alvin E. 1984. “The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns
and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory.” Journal of Political Economy,
92: 991–1016.
Roth, Alvin E. 2008. “What Have We Learned from Market Design?” The
Economic Journal, 118(527): 285–310.
Roth, Alvin E., and Elliott Peranson. 1999. “The Redesign of the Match-
ing Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic
Design.” American Economic Review, 89(4): 748–780.
Roth, Alvin E., and Xiaolin Xing. 1997. “Turnaround Time and Bottle-
necks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical
Psychologists.” Journal of Political Economy, 105(2): 284–329.
Shimer, Robert. 2005. “The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy
with Coordination Frictions.” Journal of Political Economy, 113(5): 996–1025.
Spence, Michael. 1973. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 87(3): 355–374.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE PREFERENCE SIGNALING 39
Preference Signaling in Matching Markets
By Peter Coles, Alexey Kushnir, and Muriel Niederle
Online Appendix
B1. Proofs of supplementary results.
This subsection proves Theorem A1, Propositions A1, A2, and Lemma A1.
Proof of Proposition A1 (Binary nature of firm optimal offer). Consider firm
f from some block Fb, b ∈ {1, ..., B} with realized preference profile θ∗ ∈ Θf and
that receives signals from the set of workers WS ⊂ W ∪N . Denote worker Sf as
w and select arbitrary another worker w′ ∈ WS . We first prove that the expected
payoff to f from making an offer to w is strictly greater than the expected payoff
from making an offer to w′. We denote the strategies of firm f that correspond
to these actions as σf (θ
∗,WS) = w and σ′f (θ∗,WS) = w′.
Workers use symmetric best-in-block strategies and firms have best-in-block
beliefs. Specifically, firm f believes that it is the top firm within block Fb in the
preference lists of workers w and w′. Denote the set of all possible agents’ profiles
consistent with firm f beliefs as28
Θ¯ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ |θf = θ∗ and f = max
θw
(f ′ ∈ Fb′) for each w ∈ WS}
As in the proof of Proposition 1, we denote a permutation that changes the ranks
of w and w′ in a firm preference list as ρ : (..., w, ..., w′, ...)→ (..., w′, ..., w, ...) and
construct preference profile θ′ ∈ Θ from θ∗ as follows:
• firm f ’s preferences are the same as in θ∗: θ′f = θ∗,
• workers w and w′ are exchanged in the preference lists of firms −f : ∀f ′ ∈
−f, we have θ′f ′ = ρ(θf ′),
• workers w and w′ preference profiles are exchanged θ′w = θw′ , θ′w′ = θw,
• for any other w0 ∈ W\{w,w′}, θw0 = θ′w0 .
Since firm f ’s preference list is unchanged and since w,w′∈ WS , profile θ′ belongs
to Θ¯. Since strategies of firms −f are anonymous, then for any f ′ ∈ −f and for
any WS
f ′ ⊂ W ∪N we have
σf ′(ρ(θf ′), ρ(WSf ′)) = ρ(σf ′(θf ′ ,W
S
f ′))
28For the case of one block of firms, firm f beliefs also exclude preference profiles where firm f is a top
firm for those workers that did not send signal to firm f. That is, Θ¯ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ |θf = θ∗, f = maxθw (f ′ ∈
Fb′ ) for each w ∈ WS , and f 6= maxθw (f ′ ∈ Fb′ ) for each w ∈ W\WS}. For simplicity, we assume that
there are at least two blocks. All the derivations are also valid without change for the case of one block.
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Worker w and w′ send their signals to firm f under both profile θ and θ′. There-
fore, they do not send their signals to firms −f , i.e. ρ(WS
f ′) = W
S
f ′ . Since
θ′f = ρ(θf ) we have
σf ′(θ
′
f ′ ,WSf ′) = ρ(σf ′(θf ′ ,W
S
f ′))
This means that the probability of firm f ′ making an offer to worker w for profile
θ equals the probability of making an offer to worker w′ for profile θ′. Moreover,
since we exchange worker w and w′ preference lists for profile θ′, whenever it is
optimal for worker w to accept firm f ′s offer under profile θ, it is optimal for
worker w′ to accept an offer from firm f ′ under profile θ′. Since firm types are
independent, the probability of firm f being matched when it uses strategy σf
for profile θ equals the probability of firm f being matched when it uses strategy
σ′f for profile θ
′, i.e. mf (σf , σ−f ,θ) = mf (σ′f , σ−f ,θ
′).
Therefore, for each θ ∈ Θ¯ there exists θ′ ∈ Θ¯ such that the probability that firm
f gets an offer from worker w equals the probability that firm f gets an offer from
worker w′. Moreover, profile θ′ is different for different θ by our construction.
Since θ and θ′ are equally likely,
Eθmf (σf , σ−f ,θ |θ ∈ Θ¯) = Eθmf (σ′f , σ−f ,θ |θ ∈ Θ¯).
Therefore, the expected probability that firm f gets a match if it makes an offer
to some worker in WS is the same across all workers in WS . But within this
set, a match with Sf offers the greatest utility, so the expected payoff to f from
making an offer to Sf is strictly greater than the payoff from making an offer to
any other worker in WS .
A similar construction is valid for the workers in setW\WS . That is, the prob-
ability that firm f ’s offer is accepted is the same across all workers in W\WS .
Hence, firm f prefers making an offer to its most valuable worker, Tf , than to
any other worker in W\WS .29
Proof of Proposition A2 (Optimality of Cutoff Strategies). If workers use best-
in-block strategies and firms have best-in-block beliefs, the optimal choice of firm
f for each set of received signals is either Sf or Tf (or some lottery between them)
(see Proposition A1). In light of this, we break the proof into two parts. First
we show that the identities of workers that have sent a signal to firm f influence
neither the expected payoff of making an offer to Sf nor the expected payoff of
making an offer to Tf , conditional on the total number of signals received by f
remaining constant. Second we prove that if it is optimal for firm f to choose Sf
when it receives signals from some set of workers, then it still optimal for firm
29If Tf = Sf the statement of the proposition is still valid. Firm f believes that it is Tf ’s top firm
within block Fb and firm f prefers making an offer to Tf = Sf rather than to any other worker in W.
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f to choose Sf if the number of received signals does not change and Sf has a
smaller rank (Sf is more valuable to f).
Let us consider some firm f from block Fb, b ∈ {1, ..., B} and some realization
θ∗ of its preference list. Assume that it is optimal for f to make an offer to Sf
if it receives a set of signals WS ⊂ W ∪N . We want to show that if f receives
the set of signalsWS′ such that Sf (θ∗,WS) = Sf (θ∗,WS′) and
∣∣∣WS′∣∣∣ = ∣∣WS∣∣, it
is still optimal for f to make an offer to Sf . For simplicity, we only consider the
case when WS and WS′ differ only in one signal. (The general case then follows
straightforwardly.) That is, there exist workers w and w′ such that w belongs
to set WS , but not to set WS′ ; while w′ belongs to WS′ , but not to WS . We
consider two firm f ′s strategies for realization of signals WS and WS′ .
σf (θ
∗, ·) = Sf (θ∗, ·), σ′f (θ∗,·)=Tf (θ∗,·).
We denote the set of possible agents’ profiles that are consistent with firm f
having received signals from WS and WS′ as30
Θ¯S ≡ {θ ∈ Θ |θf = θ∗ and f = max
θw
(f ′ ∈ Fb′) for each w ∈ WS}
Θ¯S
′ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ |θf = θ∗ and f = max
θw
(f ′ ∈ Fb′) for each w ∈ WS′}
respectively. We now construct a bijection between Θ¯S and Θ¯S
′
. Denote a per-
mutation that changes the ranks of w and w′ in a firm preference profile as
ρ : (..., w, ..., w′, ...) → (..., w′, ..., w, ...). For any profile θ ∈ Θ¯S we construct
profile θ′ ∈ Θ as follows:
• firm f preferences are the same as in θ: θ′f = θ∗,
• the ranks of workers w and w′ are exchanged in the preference lists of firms
−f : ∀f ′ ∈ −f, θ′f = ρ(θf ),
• the preference lists of workers w and w′ are exchanged: θ′w = θw′ , θ′w′ = θw,
• for any other w0 ∈ W\{w,w′}, θw0 = θ
′
w0 .
Since this construction leaves the preference list of firm f unchanged, and since
workers w and w′ swap preference lists, we have that if θ ∈ Θ¯S , then θ′ ∈ Θ¯S′ . By
construction, profile θ′ is different for different θ. Finally, since the cardinality of
sets Θ¯S and Θ¯S
′
are the same, the above correspondence is a bijection.
Since firm −f strategies are anonymous, for any f ′ ∈ −f and WSf ′ ⊂ W ∪N
σf ′(ρ(θf ′), ρ(WSf ′)) = ρ
(
σf ′(θf ′ ,WSf ′)
)
.
30See footnote 28 for the definition of firm beliefs for the case of one block.
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This means that the probability of firm f ′ making an offer to worker w for any
profile θ equals the probability of firm f ′ making an offer to worker w′ for cor-
responding profile θ′. Moreover, since we exchange worker w and w′ preference
lists for profile θ′, whenever it is optimal for worker w to accept firm f offer for
profile θ, it is optimal for worker w′ to accept firm f ′s offer for profile θ′. Since
firms types are independent, the probability of firm f being matched when it
uses strategy σf (θ
∗, ·) for profile θ equals the probability of firm f being matched
when it uses strategy σf (θ
∗, ·) for profile θ′:
mf (σf , σ−f ,θ) = mf (σf , σ−f ,θ′).
Similarly, for strategy σ′f (θ
∗, ·) we have mf (σ′f , σ−f ,θ) = mf (σ′f , σ−f ,θ′). Since
our construction is a bijection between Θ¯S and Θ¯S
′
, and since θ and θ′ are equally
likely, we have
Eθmf (σf , σ−f ,θ |θ ∈ Θ¯S) = Eθmf (σf , σ−f ,θ′ |θ′ ∈ Θ¯S′)
Eθmf (σ′f , σ−f ,θ |θ ∈ Θ¯S) = Eθmf (σ′f , σ−f ,θ′ |θ′ ∈ Θ¯S
′
).
Therefore, if firm f optimally makes an offer to Sf (Tf ) when it has received
set of signals WS , it also should optimally make an offer to Sf (Tf ), which is the
same worker, for the set of signals WS′ .
We now prove that if firm f optimally chooses Sf (θ
∗,WS) when it receives
signals fromWS , then it should still optimally choose Sf (θ∗,WS′) for set of signals
WS′ , if the number of received signals is the same
∣∣∣WS′∣∣∣ = ∣∣WS∣∣ and Sf (θ∗,WS′)
has a smaller rank, that is, when the signaling worker is more valuable to f . We
consider set WS′ that differs from WS only in the best (for firm f) worker and
the difference between the ranks of top signaled workers equals one. (The general
case follows straightforwardly.) That is,
w ∈ WS/Sf (θ∗,WS)⇔ w ∈ WS′/Sf (θ∗,WS′) and
rankf (Sf (θ
∗,WS′)) = rankf (Sf (θ∗,WS))− 1.
The construction in the first part of the proof works again in this case. Using sets
of profiles and a correspondence similar to the one above, we can show that the
probabilities of firm f being matched with Sf (Tf ) are the same forWS andWS′ .
Observe that if firm f ’s offer to Tf is accepted, naturally firm f gets the same
payoff for setsWS andWS′ . If firm f ’s offer to Sf is accepted, firm f gets strictly
greater payoff for setWS′ compared to setWS , because by definition Sf (θ∗,WS′)
has smaller rank than Sf (θ
∗,WS). Hence, if it is optimal for firm f to make an
offer to Sf (θ
∗,WS) when it receives set of signals WS , it is optimal for firm f to
make an offer to Sf (θ
∗,WS′) when firm f receives set of signals WS′ .
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Combined, the two statements we have just proved allow us to conclude that if
firms −f use anonymous strategies, firm f ’s optimal strategy can be represented
as some cutoff strategy.31
Proof of Theorem A1. As discussed in Section III, in any symmetric nonbab-
bling equilibrium each worker sends its signal to its most preferred firm. Conse-
quently, all information sets for firms are realized with positive probability, so firm
beliefs are determined by Bayes’ Law: if a firm receives a signal from a worker,
it believes that worker ranks the firm first in its preference list. We now take
these worker strategies and firm beliefs as fixed, and analyze the second stage of
the game when firms choose offers. We will show that this reduced game is a
super-modular game, and then use the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) to
prove our theorem.
We analyze the game where we restrict firm strategies to be cutoff strate-
gies. Denote the set of cutoff strategy profiles as Σcut, with typical element σ =
(σf1 , ..., σfF ). Recall that a cutoff strategy for firm f is a vector σf = (j
1
f , ..., j
W
f )
where jkf corresponds to the cutoff when firm f receives k signals. We will con-
sider only strategies where each cutoff is a natural number, i.e. jkf ∈ {1, ...,W}.
As defined on p.16, vector comparison yields a natural partial order on Σcut:
σ ≥Σcut σ′ ⇔ σf ≥ σ′f ⇔ jkf ≥
(
jkf
)′
for any f ∈ F and k ∈ {1, ...,W}. This
partial order is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
To show the second stage is a game with strategic complementarities, we need
to verify that Eθ(pif (σf , σ−f ,θ)) is super-modular in σf and Eθ(pif (σf , σ−f ,θ))
has increasing differences in σf and σ−f . The former is trivially true because
when f shifts one of its cutoff vector components, this does not influence the
change in payoff from a shift of another cutoff vector component. Namely, if we
consider σ1f = (..., jl, ..., jk, ...), σ
2
f = (..., j
′
l, ..., jk, ...), σ
3
f = (..., jl, ..., j
′
k, ...), and
σ4f = (..., j
′
l, ..., j
′
k, ...) for some l, k ∈ {1, ...,W} , then
Eθ(pif (σ1f , σ−f ,θ))−Eθ(pif (σ2f , σ−f ,θ)) = Eθ(pif (σ3f , σ−f ,θ))−Eθ(pif (σ4f , σ−f ,θ))
That Eθ(pif (σf , σ−f ,θ)) has increasing differences in σf and σ−f follows from
Proposition 3. Namely, for any σf , σ−f , σ′f , and σ
′
−f such that σ
′
f ≥ σf and
σ′−f ≥ σ−f we have
Eθ(pif (σ′f , σ′−f ,θ))−Eθ(pif (σf , σ′−f ,θ)) ≥ Eθ(pif (σ′f , σ−f ,θ))−Eθ(pif (σf , σ−f ,θ))
Hence the second stage of the game, when firms choose their strategies, is a game
31Note that there can be other optimal strategies. If firm f is indifferent between making an offer to
Sf and making an offer to Tf for some set of signals, firm f could optimally make its offer to Sf or to
Tf for any set of signals conditional on maintaining the same rank of the most preferred signaling worker
and cardinality of signals received.
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with strategic complementarities. Since in our model firms are ex-ante symmet-
ric, Theorem 5 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) establishes the existence of largest
and smallest symmetric pure strategy equilibria.
Proof of Lemma A1. We first prove the statement regarding the expected
number of matches. Consider firm f cutoff strategies σf and σ
′
f , such that σ
′
f has
weakly greater cutoffs, and define two sets of preference profiles as
Θ¯+ ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | m(σf , σ−f ,θ) < m(σ′f , σ−f ,θ)}
Θ¯− ≡ {θ ∈ Θ | m(σf , σ−f ,θ) > m(σ′f , σ−f ,θ)}.
For each profile θ from set Θ+, it must be the case that without firm f ’s offer,
Tf has an offer from another firm and worker Sf does not:
(B1) m(σ′f , σ−f ,θ)−m(σf , σ−f ,θ) = 1.
Similarly, if profile θ is from set Θ−, it must be the case that without firm f offer,
Sf has an offer from another firm, and Tf does not
(B2) m(σ′f , σ−f ,θ)−m(σf , σ−f ,θ) = −1.
We now show that |Θ¯+| ≥ |Θ¯−|. Equations (B1) and (B2), along with the fact
that each θ ∈ Θ+ ∪Θ− occurs equally likely, is then enough to prove the result.
Let us denote Tf = w
′ and Sf = w. We construct function ψ : Θ→ Θ as follows.
Let ψ(θ) be the profile in which workers have preferences as in θ, but firms −f
all swap the positions of workers w′ and w in their preference lists. If profile θ
belongs to Θ¯−, without firm f ’s offer, worker w has an offer from another firm,
and worker w′ does not. Therefore, when preferences are ψ(θ), without firm f ’s
offer the following two statements must be true: i) worker w′ must have another
offer and ii) worker w cannot have another offer.
To see i), note that under θ, worker w sends a signal to firm f , so his outside
offer must come from some firm f ′ who has ranked him first. Under profile ψ(θ),
firm f ′ ranks worker w′ first. If worker w′ has not sent a signal to firm f ′, then
by anonymity, w′ gets the offer of firm f ′. If worker w′ has signaled to firm f ′,
worker w′ again gets firm f ′’s offer.
To see ii), suppose to the contrary that under ψ(θ), worker w does in fact
receive an offer from some firm f ′ 6= f . Since worker w sends a signal to firm f ,
worker w must be Tf ′ under ψ(θ), so that worker w
′ is Tf ′ under θ. But then
by anonymity w′ receives the offer of firm f ′ under θ, a contradiction. From i)
and ii), we have θ ∈ Θ¯− ⇒ ψ(θ) ∈ Θ¯+. Since function ψ is injective, we have
|Θ¯+| ≥ |Θ¯−|.
In order to prove the second statement note that the expected number of
matches of each worker increases when firm f responds more to signals. Using
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the construction presented above, one can show that whenever worker w “loses”
a match with firm f for profile θ (worker w is Tf ) it is possible to construct
profile θ′ when worker w obtains a match (worker w is Sf ). The function that
matches these profiles is again injective. Moreover, worker w values more greatly
the match with firm f when she has signaled it (Sf ) rather when she is simply
highest ranked (Tf ). Therefore, the ex-ante utility of worker w increases when
firm f responds more to signals.
B2. Market Structure and the Value of a Signaling Mechanism — Proofs and
Extensions
This set of results pertains to Section V: Market Structure and the Value of
a Signaling Mechanism. In this section, we denote as u(j) the utility of a firm
from matching with its jth ranked worker. The first proposition states that when
preferences over workers are sufficiently flat, then in any nonbabbling equilibrium
firms always respond to signals.
PROPOSITION B1: Under the assumption that
(B3) u(W ) > WF
(
1− (1− 1W )F)u(1)
there is a unique nonbabbling equilibrium in the offer game with signals. Each
worker sends her signal to her top firm. Each firm f makes an offer to Sf if it
receives at least one signal; otherwise, firm f makes an offer to Tf .
Proof of Proposition B1. We will show that under condition (B3) even if Sf
is the worst ranked worker in firm f preferences, firm f still optimally makes her
an offer.
Proposition 3 shows that if firms −f respond more to signals, i.e. increase their
cutoffs, it is also optimal for firm f to respond more to signals. Therefore, if
firm f optimally responds to signals when no other firm does, it will certainly
optimally respond to signals when other firms respond. Hence, it will be enough
to consider the incentives of firm f when firms −f do not respond to signals and
always make an offer their top ranked workers.
Let us consider some realized profile of preferences of firm f and denote Tf as
w. If firms −f do not respond to signals, then some firm among −f makes an
offer to worker w with probability q = 1/W . Therefore, the probability that the
offer of firm f to worker w is accepted equals
(1− q)F−1 + ...+ CjF−1qj (1− q)F−1−j 1j+1 + ...+ qF−1 1F
where Cyx = x!/(y!(x − y)!). Intuitively, j firms among the other F − 1 firms
simultaneously make an offer to worker w with probability CjF−1q
j(1− q)F−1−j .
Therefore, firm f is matched with worker w only with probability 1/(j+1) because
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worker w’s preferences are uniformly distributed. The sum over all possible j from
0 to F − 1 gives us the overall probability of firm f ’s offer being accepted. This
expression simplifies to
(B4) WF
(
1− (1− 1W )F)
Alternatively, firm f ’s offer to its top signaled worker is accepted with probability
one. Therefore, firm f optimally makes an offer to the signaled worker only if (B3)
holds. We conclude that under Assumption (B3) there is no other nonbabbling
symmetric equilibrium in the offer game with signals.
PROPOSITION B2: Consider the following assumptions on agent utility func-
tions and the discount factor:
u(W ) > WF
(
1− (1− 1W )F)u(1)
u(W ) > δu(1), v(W ) > δv(1)
Then the following holds:
1) There is a unique symmetric sequential equilibrium in the offer game with
no signals and L periods of interaction: each firm makes an offer to its most
preferred worker and each worker accepts its best offer in each period.
2) There is a unique symmetric, sequential, nonbabbling (in each period) equi-
librium in the offer game with signals and L periods of interaction: in pe-
riod 0, each worker sends her signal to her most preferred firm; in periods
l = 1, ..., L, each firm makes an offer at to its top signaling worker among
workers remaining in the market; otherwise the firm makes an offer to its
top ranked worker among those in the market. Each worker accepts the best
available offer in each period.
Proof of Proposition B2. Consider the offer game with no signals and L periods
of interaction. We will apply backward induction, examining first the final stage
of the game. The final stage of the game is identical to a one period offer game
with no signals. Hence, each firm makes an offer to its top ranked worker and
each worker accepts best available offer in the unique symmetric equilibrium of
this stage.
Assumptions u(W ) > δu(1) and v(W ) > δv(1) guarantee that there is no
incentive to hold offers or make dynamically strategic offers. Since firms −f use
symmetric anonymous strategies at stage L − 1 and stage L, the only optimal
strategy of firm f at stage L − 1 is to make an offer to Tf . Each worker who
receives at least one offer in stage L− 1 optimally accepts the best available offer
immediately. Similar logic applies to the other stages.
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Now consider the offer game with signals and L periods of interaction. The
symmetry of the strategies of workers −w and the anonymity of firm strategies
guarantee that the equilibrium probability that a firm makes an offer to worker
w (across any of the L periods) conditional on receiving a signal from w (and
also conditional on not receiving her signal) is the same for all firms. Therefore,
workers optimally send their signals to their most preferred firm in period 0.
Observe that signals play a meaningful role for firms only in the first period.
Since u(W ) > δu(1) and u(W ) > W/F
(
1− (1− 1/W )F
)
u(1), each firm f makes
an offer at period 1 to Sf if it receives at least one signal. Since v(W ) > δv(1)
workers accept the best available offers immediately. In period 2, each remain-
ing firm either receives no signals or else see its offer being rejected in period 1.
Thereafter firm offers to their most preferred remaining workers prevail, as the
logic of backward induction in the offer game with no signals and many periods
applies to periods 2 through L.
Proof of Proposition 4 (Balanced Markets). We first calculate an explicit
formula for the increase in the expected number of matches from the introduction
of the signaling mechanism.
LEMMA B1: Consider a market with W workers and F > 2 firms. The expected
number of matches in the offer game with no signals equals
(B5) mNS(F,W ) = W
(
1− (1− 1W )F)
The expected number of matches in the offer game with signals equals
mS(F,W ) = F
(
1− (F − 1
F
)W
)
+(B6)
F
 W (F−1)
2W−2
FW (F−2)W−1
(
1− F−1W
(
1− (F−2F−1)W
))
·
·
(
1−
(
1− 1W (F−2F−1)W−1
)F−1)

Proof of Lemma B1. Let us first calculate the expected number of matches in
the pure coordination game with no signals. Proposition 1 establishes that the
unique symmetric nonbabbling equilibrium when agents use anonymous strategies
is as follows. Each firm makes an offer to its top worker and each worker accepts
the best offer among those available. We have already calculated the probability
of firm f being matched to its top worker in Proposition B1. The probability of
this event is W/F
(
1− (1− 1/W )F
)
. Therefore, the expected total number of
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matches in the game with no signals equals
mNS(F,W ) = W
(
1− (1− 1W )F)
Let us now calculate the expected number of matches in the offer game with
signals. Proposition B1 derives agent strategies in the unique symmetric nonbab-
bling equilibrium in the pure coordination game with signals. Each worker sends
her signal to her top firm and each firm makes its offer to its top signaling worker
if it receives at least one signal, otherwise it makes an offer to its top ranked
worker. We first calculate the ex-ante probability of some firm f being matched.
We denote the set of workers who send a signal to f as WSf ⊂ W ∪N . If firm
f receives at least one signal, |WSf | > 0, it is guaranteed a match because each
worker sends her signal to her top firm. If firm f receives no signals, it makes an
offer to its top ranked worker Tf . This worker accepts firm f ’s offer only if the
offer is the best one among those she receives. Let us denote the probability that
Tf accepts firm f
′s offer (under the condition that firm f receives no signals) as
PTf ,|WSf |=0 ≡ P (Tf accepts firm f
′s offer| ∣∣WSf ∣∣ = 0)
The ex-ante probability that firm f is matched then equals
Prob matchf (F,W ) = P (|WSf | > 0) · 1 + P (|WSf | = 0) · PTf ,|WSf |=0
If firm f receives no signals, |WSf | = 0, it makes an offer to Tf , which we will
call worker w. Worker w receives an offer from its top ranked firm, say firm f0,
conditional on firm f receiving no signals, |WSf | = 0, with probability equal to
G = P (|WSf0 | = 1||WSf | = 0) · 1 + ...+ P (|WSf0 | = W ||WSf | = 0) · 1W
=
∑W−1
j=0
CjW−1
(
1
F−1
)j
(1− 1F−1)W−j−1 1j+1 .
Intuitively, firm f0 receives a signal from a particular worker with probability
1/(F − 1) (note that firm f receives no signals). Then, if firm f0 receives signals
from j other workers, worker w receives an offer from firm f0 with probability
1/(j + 1). Similarly to equation (B4) the expression for G simplifies to
G = F−1W
(
1− (1− 1F−1)W
)
.
Firm f can be matched with worker w only if worker w does not receive an offer
from its top firm, which happens with probability 1 − G. If worker w does not
receive an offer from her top firm − firm f0 − firm f competes with other firms
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that have received no signals from workers. The probability that some firm f ′
among firms F\{f, f0} receives no signals conditional on the fact that worker
w sends her signal to firm f0 and firm f receives no signals (|WSf | = 0) equals
r = (1− 1/(F − 1))W−1. Note that the probability that firm f ′ does not receive
a signal from a worker equals 1 − 1/(F − 1), because firm f receives no signals.
There are also only W − 1 workers that can send a signal to firm f ′, because
worker w sends her signal to firm f0.
Therefore, the probability that some firm f ′ among firms F\{f, f0} receives no
signals and makes an offer to worker w, conditional on the fact that worker w
sends her signal to firm f0, equals r/W . Therefore, the probability that worker
w prefers the offer of firm f to other offers (conditional on the fact that firm f
receives no signals and worker w sends her signal to firm f0) equals
32
∑F−2
j=0
CjF−2
(
r
W
)j
(1− rW )F−2−j 1j+1 = W(F−1)r
(
1− (1− rW )F−1) .
The probability that worker w accepts firm f ′s offer then equals
PTf ,|WSf |=0 = (1−G)
(
W
(F−1)r
(
1− (1− rW )F−1)) .
Taking into account that firm f receives no signals with probability P (|WSf | =
0) = (1− 1/F )W , the probability of firm f being matched in the offer game with
signals is then
Prob matchf (F,W ) = 1− (1− 1F )W + (1− 1F )W W(F−1)r ·
·
(
1− F−1W
(
1− (1− 1F−1)W
))(
1− (1− rW )F−1)
where r = (1−1/(F −1))W−1. The expected total number of matches in the offer
game with signals equals mS(F,W ) = F · Prob matchf (F,W ). This completes
the proof of Lemma B1.
Lemma B1 establishes the expected total number of matches in the offer game
with and without signals. Let us first fix W and calculate where the increase in the
expected number of matches from the introduction of the signaling mechanism,
V (F,W ) = mS(F,W )−mNS(F,W ), attains its maximum. In order to derive the
result of the proposition we consider markets with a large number of firms and
workers and we use Taylor’s expansion formula:
(B7) (1− a)b = exp(−ab+O(a2b)),
32Note that the maximum number of offers worker w could get equals to M − 1 as it does not receive
an offer from its top firm f0.
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where O(a2b) is a function that is smaller than a constant for large values of a2b.
Using the result of Lemma B1 and formular (B7) one could immediately calculate
the approximation of the expected number of matches from the introduction of
the signaling mechanism in large markets
W
(
x− xe−1/x +
(
1− x
(
1− e−1/x
))
(1− e−xe−1/x)− 1 + e−x
)
+O(1)
where we denote x = F/W . Therefore V (F,W ) = Wα(x) + O(1), where α(x)
is a positive quasi-concave function that attains maximum at x0 ' 1.012113.
Therefore, for fixed W , V (F,W ) attains its maximum value at F = x0W +O(1).
Similar to the previous derivation, we can fix F . Then we obtain
F
(
1− e−1/x +
(
1− x
(
1− e−1/x
))
1
x(1− e−xe
−1/x
)− 1x
(
1− e−x))+O(1)
Therefore V (F,W ) = Fβ(x) +O(1), where β(x) is a positive quasi-concave func-
tion that attains maximum at x00 ' 0.53074. Therefore, for fixed F , V (F,W )
attains its maximum value at W = y0F +O(1), where y0 = 1/x00 = 1.8842.
Proof of Proposition 5 (Multiple Periods). We will prove the argument un-
der assumptions on agents’ utility and discount factor of Propositions B2 that
guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium in the games with and without signals.
For clarity of the argument, we compare markets with one and two periods of
interaction. Consider a market with two periods. Since workers can send only
one signal and firms respond to all signals, all firms that receive at least one
signal leave the market in period 1 (signals indicate that offers will be accepted
for sure). Therefore, no firms remaining in period 2 have received signals, so the
second period of the offer game with signals is identical to a single period offer
game with no signals.
Since the introduction of the signaling mechanism increases the expected num-
ber of matches, the expected number of remaining market participants in period
2 is greater in the offer game with no signals than it is in the offer game with
signals. As Proposition 4 shows, the number of matches in a market with one
period is proportional to the size of the market. Therefore, the expected number
of matches in the second period in the offer game with no signals is greater than
in the offer game with signals. In other words, the second period plays a more
significant role in the offer game with no signals. Hence, the difference between
the expected number of matches in the offer game with signals and the offer game
with no signals decreases upon adding the second period of interaction. This logic
extends to L periods of interaction.
